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Perils, pitfalls of aid

Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, Roel Landingin - The Philippine Star

(Second of a series)

MANILA, Philippines – Early last year, President Arroyo proposed a new BOT law implementing rules that would diminish NEDA-ICC’s powers in approving infrastructure projects funded and implemented by the private sector. Under these rules, which ostensibly aim to hasten the BOT evaluation process, implementing agencies such as government departments, state-owned firms, and local government units would have the authority to approve the projects.

The new BOT rules followed previous moves by Mrs. Arroyo “to authorize agencies to approve contracts (worth) less than P500 million, except BOT, without going through the NEDA-ICC process, as long as the DBM (Department of Budget and Management) can certify the availability of funds,” according to a March 2005 ICC policy directive.

Malacañang has put off issuing the new BOT rules after multilateral lenders and the foreign chambers of commerce objected to clipping the powers of the NEDA-ICC.

But the erosion of NEDA’s powers and independence continues, with the creation of new Cabinet groupings with powers that overstep those of existing NEDA bodies.

In May 2007, Arroyo issued an administrative order creating the so-called NEDA Cabinet Group that makes major economic decisions, including the approval of proposed projects, in between the monthly meetings of the NEDA Board.

She also set up the Pro-Performance System Steering Committee that would monitor and evaluate “all increases in project cost, whether local or foreign funded.” Until then, it was the NEDA-ICC that approved cost increases in foreign-assisted projects, without which the Department of Budget and Management could not release additional funding.

Tough standards for project approval are being relaxed. In a memorandum issued after the Oct. 9 meeting of the NEDA Cabinet group, Cabinet Secretary Ricardo Saludo told NEDA to review the 15-percent minimum economic internal rate of return (EIRR) required for ICC approval of proposed projects “with the end in view of reducing it.”

Alonzo, who notes that other administrations also had ad hoc economic policy groups, nonetheless warns they create opportunities for “forum shopping” for officials and agencies pushing for projects that do not pass muster with the ICC or NEDA staff.

The erosion of NEDA’s power and independence diminishes the gains made by the agency in recent years to improve the project evaluation system.

Jonathan Uy, public investment staff head, recounts that NEDA has adopted tougher standards in the way the agency approves projects. He says, “Before we were looking at projects as projects. We were looking at the trees. Now, we’re looking at the forest. When you submit a proposal you don’t just justify it as a good project alone. You have to show why it’s a good project in the whole program of things.”

Pressure, fudged numbers

NEDA personnel tell of being subjected to varying degrees of pressure to tweak project evaluation numbers toward improving projected returns of favored projects.

For instance, members of NEDA’s project monitoring staff working on a Japanese-funded irrigation project in Bohol recall receiving “a suggestion” to count the dam’s beneficial impact on counter-insurgency efforts to boost the project’s returns, which fell below the 15-percent hurdle rate after costs soared by half.

Roderick Planta, head of the NEDA project monitoring staff, recalls being told by a Cabinet member, “Kargahan n’yo na lang. Ilagay n’yo na lang ang benefits sa counter-insurgency (Just boost the numbers. Include the benefits to the counter-insurgency program).”

The NEDA economist says he refused, since no data or econometric model exists that would help them decide how much monetary value to put on quelling the communist insurgency.

Recounting the incident months later, Planta explains his refusal to fudge the numbers: “We are not blind to that. You can still pass the project even if EIRR is only 12 percent. That’s okay but don’t prostitute the process. It will hurt everybody’s credibility.”

Fuzzy logic

Still, the NEDA personnel are not always successful in resisting instructions from higher officials to improve cost-benefit numbers of projects, especially those enjoying strong backing from what Lozada calls “good political sponsors.” That may help explain the fuzzy economic logic that underscored the NEDA-ICC’s approval of the NBN project.

As initially conceived by the DOTC and the Commission on Information and Communication Technology (CICT), a major NBN component was to provide Internet connection to 23,549 schools nationwide. This was on top of a telecommunications network linking close to 2,300 national government offices.

The Chinese government, however, refused to finance the education component, dealing the project a potentially fatal blow. The NEDA staff had estimated that economic return on the project would fall from 20 percent to only 13.01 percent, below the 15-percent hurdle rate, if the schools’ Internet connection were taken out of the project.

To keep project returns above 15 percent, DOTC and CICT proposed to substitute exactly 23,549 municipalities and barangay offices for the schools that would be taken out of the project. The NEDA-ICC Technical Board and Cabinet Committee, in a joint meeting on March 26, 2007, agreed with the project proponents.

“The option to provide connectivity to local government offices such as barangay offices may be explored, so as to optimize utilization of the NBN infrastructure,” the NEDA-ICC Technical Board and Cabinet Committee concluded, according to the meeting’s minutes.

NEDA’s evaluation report showed that benefits, consisting largely of savings in government’s phone, Internet and mobile expenses, are higher than costs over the next 15 years or so.

But in estimating savings, the NEDA staff largely adopted the optimistic assumptions of the project proponents. For example, all schools or offices covered by the project that do not currently spend for Internet access are assumed to have Internet connection through a private Internet service provider.

Even Neri found the assumption too optimistic and questioned it in one of the meetings of the NEDA-ICC Technical Board and Cabinet Committee. “Savings in Internet connection cannot be considered as a benefit given that the government does not have much Internet connection,” Neri had pointed out, according to minutes of the meeting.

Too bad Neri did not pursue the point further. It could have made all the difference in how the public and his former colleagues should regard him now.

Bids, tied loans favor contractors

For Antonio Molano Jr. and other government engineers at the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), it felt like being in “Groundhog Day,” the Bill Murray movie about a cynical TV reporter who kept reliving the same day over and over again.

Over a span of four years, Molano and his colleagues at the DPWH bids and awards committee (BAC) held three rounds of bidding for two World Bank-funded road projects in Mindanao and the Visayas.

Each time, all the bids exceeded estimated costs by wide margins. Each time, virtually the same set of construction companies won the first and second rounds.

The road projects were part of Phase 1 of the $305-million National Road Improvement and Management Project (NRIMP) that the World Bank was supporting with a $150-million loan. Unhappy with the high bids, the World Bank rejected the bid outcomes not once or twice, but thrice.

The DPWH went to great lengths to boost competition in the bidding for the road-building projects. At one point, “an independent call line outside the DPWH was established for any party to report any deviation from the process,” says Molano. “We invited civil society groups such as Procurement Watch and the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption as observers.”

But these and other measures proved to be no match to the persistence and power of some suppliers to dictate their terms on bids for government infrastructure contracts, often in defiance of government rules and policies.

Rigged bids, same firms

The contractors’ doggedness underscores the huge and lucrative merits of building foreign-assisted projects, and is among the symptoms of what Rodolfo Lozada Jr., a Senate star witness in the National Broadband Network (NBN) scandal, has called a “dysfunctional” government procurement system.

Some of the construction firms that took part in the controversial projects were also among the most successful bidders for government public-works contracts. This is evident in a report prepared by the Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines and Philippine Domestic Construction Board (CIAP-PDCB) that the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) analyzed.

Nine mostly Chinese and local construction firms that joined the ill-fated bids for the road projects were also the big players in many other projects funded by foreign money.

These nine firms accounted for 46 percent of the total value of civil-works contracts of ongoing or completed foreign-assisted projects between 2004 and 2006, the CIAP-PDCB’s Constructors Performance Evaluation System report showed.

Bid-rigging and corruption were suspected by the World Bank, which carried out a year-long investigation into the matter. Last November, the Bank deferred approval of a $232-million loan for the national roads project’s second phase, pending completion of its probe.

But contractors and government officials alike say foreign lenders like the World Bank may also be to blame for the apparent corruption plaguing official development assistance (ODA)-funded projects. 

International financial institutions had thumbed down a Philippine proposal to impose a cap on bids for these projects. Instead, the lenders have insisted on exempting foreign-assisted projects from new Philippine procurement rules that disallow bids above the so-called approved budget contract (ABC), the estimated cost that is calculated by third-party consultants at considerable expense.

Invitation to collusion

Manolito Madrasto, executive director of the industry group Philippine Contractors Association, says the industry itself is supporting the government’s efforts to convince ODA donors to adopt Philippine procurement rules.

He says the absence of caps on bids for these projects is a virtual invitation to collusion.

“Anybody who bids beyond (the ABC) in the Philippine setting is automatically out of the running,” he points out. “Under World Bank (rules) there is no limit. You can even put in 10 times if you want. If the bidders talk to each other, is there a way to stop it?”

Cipriano Ravanes Jr., an independent procurement expert, agrees that putting a cap on bidding may be necessary, given the rampant collusion and overpricing in the local contracting industry. “If the approved budget contract reflects market price, it will protect the government,” he says. “But even if the ABC is overpriced, it can still help because it imposes a limit.”

In June 2002, the DPWH issued a department order stating that bids for civil works and supply contracts above 15 percent of the approved budget contract would be rejected outright. Then Public Works Secretary Simeon Datumanong noted that awarded contracts for foreign-assisted projects were higher than approved costs by an average of 15 percent, with some going as high as 30 percent.

Country managers of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), Asian Development Bank (ADB), and World Bank promptly wrote a joint letter opposing the order, reminding Datumanong that the imposition of contract price ceilings violates their procurement guidelines.

The order was not implemented because of the lenders’ objections.

More ‘groundhog days’

Without the caps, DPWH’s Molano could only have more “groundhog days,” even as he and his colleagues scamper to implement stricter procedures for the biddings on infrastructure projects.

Up to now, Molano can only shake his head over their efforts in trying to prevent any shenanigans in the two road projects in Visayas and Mindanao. After the World Bank rejected the results of the first bidding, Molano and company changed some of the procedures for the second bidding. Among these were the disqualification of one of the bidders and the removal of the pre-qualification requirement.

This opened up the bidding to more contractors — to no avail. The winner in the second bidding, China Road and Bridge Corp., a Chinese state-owned firm, had also clinched the first bidding for a section of the Surigao-Davao coastal road project in Mindanao. The other project component, the Kabankalan-Basay section in Negros Island, was won by a joint venture of China Road and local contractor EC Luna, which also figured as a winner in the first bidding (though its partner then was China State Construction Corp.).

When the World Bank again rejected the bids, the DPWH made more changes for the third bidding. The Negros island project was divided into two smaller packages. Instead of just one, two complaint hotlines were established – at the World Bank country office and the Government Procurement Policy Board. “We were very strict,” says Molano. “If a bidder lacks a document, we disqualify it.”

The results were a little different for the third bidding held in 2006. China Road, which previously won the Surigao-Davao section, bagged one of the two components of the Negros road project. But two new bidders, China Wu Yi Corp. and China Geo Engineering Corp., won the two other projects.

Still, the World Bank rejected the results due to what it called “strong signs of collusion and excessive pricing.” Bank officials did not explain what that meant but a person familiar with the investigation said a disgruntled supplier had reportedly written the Bank a “poison letter” outlining plans by bidders for manipulating the auction.

All the bids in the third round were higher than the DPWH’s estimated cost. Also, all the bids, save for the lowest, clustered around a high number, a possible but not conclusive sign that the bidders were helping one of them win the contract.

The PCIJ wrote letters and made calls to all the companies involved but most did not respond to requests for comment. Hanjin, in an email, said the company’s officials “are not aware of any allegations of collusion and excessive pricing.”

Tied money

In large part, the lenders’ objection to caps on bids reflects their view that the price of government projects, like everything else, should be set by free and competitive markets rather than by government bureaucrats.

In practice, however, the policy against bid caps tends to benefit big foreign construction companies that win contracts for public-works projects funded by ODA loans.

PCIJ’s analysis of the CIAP-PDCB’s Constructors Performance Evaluation System Report revealed that 18 companies from Japan, Korea, Thailand, and China won 71 percent of the total value of civil-works contracts for foreign-assisted projects reviewed in the report. These foreign firms were awarded an average of P2.6 billion worth of contracts.

In contrast, 79 Philippine companies, which got the remaining 29 percent of civil-works contracts, won an average of only P240 million worth of contracts per firm.

Of the 10 biggest construction contracts for ODA-funded projects included in the report, only one was awarded to a Philippine company, Cavite Ideal International Construction & Development Corp. It won a P1.6-billion contract to build or upgrade a stretch of road linking Baguio to nearby towns in Benguet province.

The dominant role of foreign contractors in implementing ODA projects is a sore point for local contractors who feel that pre-qualification standards imposed by lenders are biased in favor of big foreign bidders.

Comments Madrasto: “When they fund an airport, they require that the contractor must have experience in putting up an airport of the same size in the last five years. But how often do you put up an airport?” Yet when the projects are awarded to foreign companies, these just turn around and subcontract the bulk of the actual work to local firms.

Cost overruns

For some reason, excessive bids and cost overruns are quite common for projects funded by bilateral lenders – notably Japan, Korea, and China – that still tie up sizable portions of their foreign aid to the purchase of goods or services, including consultants, from companies based in their respective countries.

Allowing bids to exceed estimated costs makes infrastructure projects costlier for borrowers. “These cost overruns have resulted in an increase in GOP (Government of the Philippines) counterpart funding,” Datumanong had stated in his proposed department order back in 2002. “In some cases, it has caused the decrease in the scope of work of the other remaining projects in the loan package to compensate for increased cost of the projects already bid out.”

A 2007 study for JBIC by the consulting firm Virata and Associates found that 13 of 14 road projects funded by the World Bank, ADB, and JBIC cost 26 percent to 51 percent more than DPWH estimates.

Last year, the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) also reported that 21 projects — nearly a fifth of the 123 ongoing foreign-assisted projects it reviewed — incurred cost overruns amounting to almost P36 billion, raising the total costs for these projects by more than a third.

In nine of the 21 projects, bids in excess of the approved costs were cited as a reason for the cost escalation. Eight of these nine projects were financed by JBIC.

The JBIC also funded 18 of the 21 projects that incurred cost overruns last year, while the other three were financed by loans from China, South Korea, and the World Bank.  

A cost-benefit game

High bids and cost increases in bilaterally funded projects show that the debate over bidding caps is more than an academic or policy debate. It is, in truth, a cost-benefit game.

The issue entails costs for borrowers such as the Philippines, which must raise its local counterpart funding. In contrast, the situation benefits contractors awarded the lucrative contracts with no or restricted bidding among companies from the lending country.

A case in point is the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway Project, the country’s second biggest foreign-funded project that is being built by Kajima Corp., Hazama Corp., and other Japanese companies with the backing of a $355-million loan from JBIC.

Apart from being Japan’s single biggest project loan to the Philippines, it is also notable for another less edifying reason: It has the biggest cost overrun so far among the ODA-funded projects.

When NEDA approved the project in 1999, the cost was estimated at P15.3 billion. In 2000, the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA), which was implementing it, raised the cost estimate to P18.7 billion. NEDA approved this the following year.

But the lowest bid BCDA got when it auctioned off the contracts between September 2003 and January 2004 was P27 billion. Though it knew that costs had gone up to P25.1 billion, BCDA was hoping competition among the bidders would force down the price.

BCDA was being overly optimistic. The loan was tied and bidders were limited to a few Japanese construction companies.  Madrasto suggests that BCDA could  have gotten lower bids if the tender was opened to local construction companies.

NEDA refused to approve the higher cost, prompting BCDA to negotiate with the winning bidder to bring the price down to P20.1 billion. NEDA cleared the award to the Japanese companies but the latest indications are that the cost may go up to P32 billion.

An even chance

Still, some lenders seem to be softening their opposition to Manila’s moves to impose bidding caps for foreign-assisted projects. The World Bank has agreed to set price ceilings on at least three road projects that it plans to fund as part of the stalled loan for the second phase of the National Road Improvement and Management Project (NRIMP).

The World Bank has also started packaging its Philippine projects into smaller components, giving local suppliers and contractors an even chance to win the contracts.

About 55 percent of goods and services for World Bank-funded projects procured through international competitive bidding between July 2000 and February 2007 went to Philippine-based suppliers, according to World Bank procurement data. The Philippines was followed by South Korean suppliers, who got 18 percent, and Chinese companies, 13 percent.

Some of the so-called Philippine companies, however, are subsidiaries of foreign companies that were incorporated locally. In fact, the single biggest World Bank-funded civil-works contract tendered through national competitive bidding was awarded to China State Construction Engineering Corp., which was classified in the World Bank database as a Philippine company even though it is a unit of a Chinese state firm.

Japan had already begun to reform its lending policies in the 1990s in response to criticisms that tied aid smacks of false and self-serving altruism. It reduced the proportion of tied packages in its foreign aid portfolio from 100 percent in the 1980s to only 26 percent in the early 1990s – though this has gone up again in recent years, according to a study completed last year by University of the Philippines Prof. Eduardo Tadem.

In the Philippines, Tadem says, JBIC still links, totally or partially, almost 90 percent of its loans to purchases from Japanese companies.

China, an emerging major source of ODA that was the country’s fifth biggest lender as of end-2006, also ties all of its aid to the Philippines. The Export-Import Bank of China is lending $400 million, the single biggest ongoing project loan, for the North Luzon Rail project that aims to revive rail services between Manila and Central Luzon.

Apart from tying aid to procurement from Chinese companies, China also unilaterally chooses its project contractors, precluding any competitive bidding to select the best and least costly supplier.

The practice, which is inconsistent with Philippine laws that require competitive bidding for ODA-funded projects, has generated a lot of public enmity for Chinese development aid, and sparked suspicions that the goods being supplied are either overpriced or of dubious quality.

Widespread criticism of Chinese ODA prompted President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to cancel the $329-million National Broadband Network (NBN) deal with ZTE Corp. and to review other China-funded projects, including the $542-million Cyber Education project. (To be continued)

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