Thanks for the reassurance

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Manila could not have come at a more consequential time. Following his meeting with President Marcos, Rubio reaffirmed America’s “ironclad” alliance with the Philippines and the shared commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Marcos and Rubio underscored the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight in the West Philippine Sea. They also acknowledged the 10th anniversary of the July 2016 Arbitral Award, which confirmed that China’s maritime claims have no legal basis. These were welcome words, especially as Beijing intensifies its coercion towards the Philippines.

Thank you for the reassurance, Secretary Rubio. It is much appreciated. But as we all know, alliances are tested not by communiqués, but by what nations do when ships are rammed, soldiers are injured and sovereign rights are violated. When push comes to shove, we all know that America would not defend the Philippines out of charity. It will only do so to preserve its interests as follows:

First, the Philippines occupies strategic geography along the first island chain. A strong Philippines that is firmly on the US side helps restrict China’s access to the wider Pacific Ocean. On the flip side, a Philippines subordinated to Beijing would open the gates and weaken America’s position across Asia and the Pacific.

Second, northern Luzon sits near Taiwan and the Bashi Channel, a vital passage between the South China Sea and the Pacific. Philippine territory gives American forces the right positioning for surveillance, logistics, dispersal and reinforcement during conflict.

Third, trillions of dollars in trade pass through the West Philippine Sea. Washington cannot allow Beijing to convert these waters into a Chinese-controlled maritime estate.

Fourth, America’s credibility is on the line. If Washington abandons its treaty with the Philippines after repeatedly calling its commitment “ironclad,” Japan, South Korea and Australia will question every American guarantee. Some may accommodate China. Others will re-arm independently. Either outcome diminishes US power.

Still, we must view our American alliance with clear eyes. President Trump treats foreign policy as a give-and-take affair. He measures alliances by cost, immediate return and political spectacle.

A water cannon attack, collision or blockade may produce condemnations, intelligence support, weapons deliveries and naval deployments – but not American retaliatory gunfire. Even after a lethal attack, Trump would likely prefer sanctions, ultimatums and a dramatic but limited show of force. America may intervene if its credibility or forces are directly threatened. But its response could still fall short of what Filipinos imagine “ironclad” means.

What about our other partners?

Australia is the most likely operational partner. It can provide maritime surveillance aircraft, intelligence cyber support, logistics, naval escorts and, in a wider conflict, ships and combat aircraft.

Japan is indispensable but constitutionally constrained. It will likely provide radars, satellite intelligence, coast guard vessels, logistics, access to bases and protection of regional sea lanes. Direct combat becomes more likely only if the conflict threatens Japan, Taiwan or American forces based there.

South Korea will probably serve as our arsenal rather than our battlefield partner. It can accelerate deliveries of aircraft, warships, missiles, ammunition and spare parts while repairing Philippine equipment. New Zealand’s contribution will be smaller but useful: intelligence, maritime surveillance, logistics, medical units and diplomatic support.

None of these countries, however, is legally bound to fight for us. Their visiting forces and reciprocal access agreements facilitate cooperation. They are not mutual defense guarantees.

We must rely on ourselves

The stark reality is that the Philippines must rely on itself and invest in itself. We cannot defeat China symmetrically. We will never possess more arsenal than them. But we can adopt deterrence by denial – the porcupine strategy – by making aggression unbearably costly and denying Beijing a quick victory. In other words, drag them to a war not worth fighting. This requires 10 actions on the Philippines’ part.

First, build a missile wall. Invest in  hundreds of mobile land-based anti-ship missiles rather than squandering the budget on projects that enrich congressmen and senators.

Second, build the sensor network. Missiles are useless if they cannot locate and track the enemy. We need coastal radar, satellites, drones and uninterrupted intelligence links with allies.

Third, manufacture drones and unmanned vessels domestically. Quantity, replaceability and local production matter more than a handful of sophisticated imported systems. Think the Iranian strategy.

Fourth, disperse and harden the AFP. The AFP must be able to survive the opening strike, which will always be lethal.

Fifth, establish layered air and missile defenses around essential bases, ports, power facilities and communications infrastructure.

Sixth, invest selectively in fighters, submarines and frigates. These high-value assets must complement our broader strategy – not swallow the modernization budget at the expense of more essential capabilities.

Seventh, strengthen the Coast Guard for the gray-zone struggle already underway. Equip it for sustained patrols, escorted resupply and rapid documentation and publication of Chinese aggression.

Eighth, establish a civil defense system. War will include cyberattacks, disinformation, power disruption and attacks on commerce.

Ninth, convert partnerships into operational arrangements: pre-positioned ammunition, common communications, repair facilities and guaranteed wartime resupply.

Tenth, raise defense spending progressively toward three percent of GDP, protected by transparent procurement and long-term appropriations.

The formula is this – see the enemy early, survive the first strike, deny access, impose unacceptable costs and continue fighting until partners arrive.

Rubio’s reassurance is valuable. But the strongest guarantee will not come from Washington, Tokyo or Canberra. It will come from a decision by Malacañang, the Philippine Congress and Senate to earnestly prepare for war.

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E-mail: [email protected]. Follow him on Twitter @aj_masigan