Manuel Quezon’s path to the Commonwealth presidency

My Quezon Day essay last year, “Road to independence: Manuel Quezon-Sergio Osmeña rivalry” (Crossroads, Aug. 19, 2020) was about the long rivalry in the political careers of the two leaders that culminated in the passage of the Philippine independence law.

Although the fight for political independence is a collective effort of many heroes, the crowning glory of achievement that put the Republic of the Philippines among the family of nations in 1946 belonged to both of them.

Manuel L. Quezon outsmarted Sergio Osmeña in the final stage of that contest. Once the prize – independence – had been won, it was as if both had triumphed together in equal measure, and so the two of them managed to coalesce and ran on the same ticket against a weak opposition.

On Nov. 15, 1936, they would be inaugurated to assume the two highest political positions in the land – the presidency and vice-presidency of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. This was 19 months from the day of approval of the Tydings-McDuffie independence law for the country in March 1934.

The story that follows is a prelude to the discussion of the Philippine economy during the Commonwealth period on issues in this column.

Pros and Antis debate the Hare-Hawes-Cutting independence law. It is to be recalled that then outgoing president Edgar Hoover, a Republican, vetoed the bill for Philippine independence on Jan. 13, 1933 on the dying days of his term.

Quickly, on Jan. 17, Congress over-rode the veto and the bill became the Hare-Hawes-Cutting independence law.

The law gave the Filipino people, expressed through its government, a period of one year to make a decision to accept independence.

Thus, 1933 would become a truly momentous year for Philippine political history. The ruling Nacionalista Party – led and presided by Manuel Quezon – would be split seriously between proponents to accept under the provisions of this law and those who had wanted it amended or rejected.

The seed of this debate arose during the negotiations for the passage of this law. Sergio Osmeña and Manuel Roxas led the mission that went to Washington to negotiate it. The work on the negotiations proved to be difficult

Quezon, who stayed in Manila to take care of home affairs and who was, after all the senior most senior political leader, to whom Osmeña reported, had in theory the final say.

Distance and work, as well as changes in events and positions of the main parties in negotiation, affected the outcome. There were times when Quezon felt that his instructions were ignored or failed to get accepted.

The mission negotiators could only offer ideas or caution, while their opposites were American administration officials steeped in colonial Philippine affairs and with legislators who were the final arbiters of the final text of the law to be written. In general, the supplicant for independence got the short end of the stick.

From Manuel Quezon’s viewpoint, there were a number of provisions that could stand improvement from a Philippine side. There were disadvantageous provisions to Philippine interests (such as the trade relations). There were provisions that could lead to misunderstandings (such as the powers given to the US High Commissioner). There were unfair and discriminatory provisions (such as the treatment of Filipinos in immigration matters). There were potentially dangerous provisions which were inimical to true independence (such as the provisions on military and naval bases).

Thus, he was not ready to accept the text of the law and he wanted some amendments to be made. These inimical features were amplified by his growing political followers at home.

On the other hand, Sergio Osmeña and his followers argued that the law that was negotiated was the best that the country could secure.

The Antis followed Quezon’s lead. And the Pros, that of Osmeña. The Antis became much stronger as the debates intensified.

In October, 1933, the Antis strongly won a resolution in the legislature to reject the Hare-Hawes-Cutting independence law following Quezon’s lead. They voted resoundingly for its rejection by the Legislature.

Quezon goes to Washington to seek amendments to HHC law. There was little time left to pass a replacement law for the independence act. If Jan. 17, 1934 were breached without such a replacement, the country was without an independence act and all could be lost.

Quezon thought that a new independence mission could save the day. This time, he led a new independence mission that was composed of the dominant Antis in the legislature.

Arriving in the US by December 1933, he made efforts to see President Franklin Roosevelt, but could not get an appointment. Washington was essentially cool to him because of the rejection of the independence law. He met essentially the barriers that Osmeña had met before. More important, the main problems of legislation in Washington were focused on solving America’s depression and the pressing social issues – the New Deal.

Even then, there was still an accommodating atmosphere toward the solution to the Philippine independence issue. He would return home with the deadline for the acceptance for independence on Jan. 17 being breached.

The new chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, Senator Millard E. Tydings was the point man on the Philippine independence issue on whom President Roosevelt depended.

Sen. Tydings was able to bring Manuel Quezon to accept a few amendments in text, especially with regard to military and naval bases, and was given further assurances to correct existing issues and inequities through future actions.

Shortly thereafter on March 2, 1934, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Congress to enact a new Philippine independence act containing this compromise. In his message, the American president emphasized an important clause to any provisions of the expired Hare-Hawes-Cutting law which would become the basis of the new law,: “Where imperfections or inequalities exist, I am confident that both can be corrected after proper hearing and in fairness to both peoples.”

The new identical independence bills were filed separately in the House and Senate.  On March 24, 1934, President Roosevelt signed the Tydings-McDuffie independence law for the Philippines. This was a law that was essentially identical to first independence law that was enacted 15 months before.

For archives of previous Crossroads essays, go to: https://www.philstar.com/authors/1336383/gerardo-p-sicat. Visit this site for more information, feedback and commentary: http://econ.upd.edu.ph/gpsicat/