Dwindling

Vladimir Putin will rule Russia for as long as he is able to hold all the reins of power. That is certain.

The elections held over the weekend was a well-managed scam. It was carefully curated to give Putin another term in office. The phony exercise takes Russia further into historic decline.

In his mind, Putin imagines he is recreating the Russian empire, rebuilding the USSR that crumbled over three decades ago. In fact, he is deepening Russian isolation, forcing the country to lose options and opportunities by the day.

In his mind, Putin sees himself a modern-day Tsar that sees his every wish fulfilled. In reality, he is a self-appointed leader filled with fear. His dread for opposition in any form produced a political order sustainable only through comprehensive repression. The cost of maintaining that repressive order will be very high – and eventually unaffordable.

As a country, Russia stretches across 11 time zones. But much of that is frigid wasteland. Its economy is much smaller than those of the major European powers. Its population of about 140 million is small relative to its global ambition.

As a consequence of its aggression against Ukraine, Russia has been subjected to layers of sanctions by the international community. Its exports of natural resources, the driving force of its backward economy, are seriously curtailed. It ability to engage in financial transactions with the rest of the world is severely limited.

Although the economic sanctions imposed against it did not immediately cripple the Russian economy, the long-term implications of being cut off from the rest of the world will be devastating. The world is now learning to get by without relying on Russia’s immense natural resources.

Most analysts believe that Putin has been waiting for the elections to finally do what has to be done. The elections might have extended Putin’s stay in office, but it did not produce the political institutions that will enable the regime to survive beyond him. As it happens in every autocracy, all other institutions such as the judicial and legislative systems have lost ground to the tyrant. Should Putin become incapacitated, there is no secure method of succession.

Having secured elections, regardless of its sheer lack of credibility, Putin must now raise taxes to fund his war machine. He might have to call for mobilization to produce the troops he needs. The Russian people will now have to endure even less spending on developing human capital. Civilian infrastructure will rot. Industrial capacity will be redirected to produce the armaments being lost in great quantity.

At the moment, the Russian Army has begun relying on mercenaries from India and Africa to fill the frontlines. Before that, the invading army relied on prison convicts for manpower. Mercenaries and convicts are never the most reliable soldiers.

Russia may seem to have the slight advantage in the Ukrainian battlefield today. That is only because the Ukrainian defenders are suffering shortages in arms and ammunition because domestic politics in the US got in the way of reliable deliveries of support. As the war drags on, there is no way Russia can match the industrial strength of the major European economies in delivering the tools of war to the front.

Russia has tens of thousands of tanks. But that is only because they store obsolete armaments from previous wars. Some of the armor Russia brought to the front were of WWII vintage – easily destroyed by modern anti-tank weapons.

Meanwhile, Ukraine has used its industrial capacity to build more powerful drones. Drone warfare took out a third of Russia’s once-proud Black Sea fleet. Longer distance drones are now attacking oil and industrial facilities deep inside Russia. Soon enough, drones will cancel out Russia’s current mastery of the air war.

Western military advisers have advised the Ukrainians against defending static frontlines. That is costly and ultimately pointless. Henceforth, with unmatched electronic intelligence available to them, the Ukrainians will increasingly hit Russian territory to undermine its ability to support its expeditionary force.

Over the past few months, Russia has relied on doubtful artillery shells supplied by North Korea, slow drones supplied by Iran and small transport assets supplied by China. The arms imports gave the Russians some momentum on the battlefield. But there are real physical limits to what the aggressor can import.

Russia does not have the technological capacity to, say, produce the computer chips needed for modern weapons systems. This will soon be a major point of weakness – especially as the Ukrainians have demonstrated capacity to produce weapons to reinvent military tactics.

Instead of overseeing Russia’s reemergence, therefore, Putin will spend the next few years trying to manage Russia’s dwindling industrial capacity. Moscow simply cannot modernize its army fast enough. As Ukraine pummels Russia’s oil refineries and weapons plants, the Russians will find it harder to fight a 21st century war with 20th century military doctrines.

Putin cannot oppress his people wholesale and expect them to fight a comprehensive war at his behest. He cannot sustain the costs of domestic repression magnifying the costs of rapid military modernization.

Modern wars are ultimately a test of each society’s capacity to supply its fighting forces. Russia cannot possibly outlast a much smaller Ukraine in this regard. The differences in morale will soon be telling.

As Russia dwindles, wallowing in its romance with empires past, Ukraine is rapidly reinventing itself as a European nation.