Collusion

Now for the inconvenient question: How much did the people of Marawi know of the Maute group’s presence in their community?

We know by now the terrorists did not invade Marawi City at the spur of the moment. They have been there, maybe 300 of them, for months. They brought with them a large cache of weaponry and an incredible amount of cash. Captured from a “machinegun nest” were checks issued by local officials.

While Army troopers were scouring the surrounding mountains for the terrorist band that earlier tried to occupy a small town, it turns out the terrorists were gathered well within the city’s fold planning a much more ambitious venture: the occupation of the Muslim city of Marawi.

Marawi, with a population of 200,000 is not a large urban jungle with a high degree of anonymity among its residents. It is an old town where neighbors lived together for generations. It is a town organized along clan lines following ancient feudal hierarchies.

It is tough for an outsider to blend in unnoticed in a place like Marawi. Outsiders are looked at with curiosity. Many residents speak only Maranao.

It is hard to imagine how the Tausog fighter Isnilon Hapilon could settle in at the center of Marawi with a band of maybe 50 Tausog-speaking fighters without calling attention to themselves. It is hard to imagine how the Maute band, probably numbering over 200 fighters, could slip in unnoticed with their hoard of weapons and brand new pick-up trucks.

When a military unit came to raid Hapilon’s suspected hideout, the troops ran into a thick phalanx of heavily armed militants.  That raid unintentionally unmasked plans to forcibly occupy the city – as the ISIS did with Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq. During that raid, the military stumbled on important information. A captured phone contained video of a conference between Hapilon and the Maute brothers plotting their moves to occupy the city.

The meeting room looked pretty comfortable. It was likely in a house within the city.

The May 23 raid might have unintentionally short-circuited the plans of the militants. Ready or not, they had to execute their plans. They quickly put their little army into combat footing, resisting attempts to retake what was effectively an already occupied city. They have paid dearly for engaging government troops in battle and, at the end of the day, will be probably wiped out by military strength.

Had the May 23 raid on Hapilon’s suspected safehouse not happened, the militants might have had the luxury of a few more weeks of planning. They could have attracted more jihadi bands from around the area: what is left of the Abu Sayyaf, the BIFF and the assortment of private armed groups in the vicinity.

It is hard to imagine the militants could have assembled what they did in Marawi undetected by the locals. There is a high probability the militants enjoyed not only tacit but active support from the city population, including material support from the traditional political lords with ears close to the ground.

When fighting commenced, the AFP apparently received little information from locals. The Army spokesman on the ground had an exceedingly low estimate of the fighting force they were confronting, initially stating the enemy force was composed of about 40 fighters. At the latest casualty toll, the military puts enemy deaths at 138.

It is clear the militants did not want for weapons and cash. The AFP is now holding a substantial hoard of captured weapons. After two weeks of fighting, the enemy shows little sign of running short of ammunition.

For some reasons, hundreds of residents did not flee the fighting in the first hour. Consequently, many days after the shooting began, an estimated 2,000 civilians are still considered trapped in the crossfire. Some of them likely waited too long to decide which side they will support.

There will be enough time to investigate all the loose ends after the city has been liberated from the militants. That investigation should not be afraid to ask inconvenient questions – even if those that cooperated with the militants subsequently suffered heavily, with many now considered hostages or human shields.

Collaboration

Justice Secretary Vitaliano Aguirre made startling accusations yesterday. He says Senators Bam Aquino and Antonio Trillanes, along with Rep. Gary Alejano and Aquino-era presidential aide Ronald Llamas were in Marawi about two weeks before fighting broke out. They were ostensibly there to meet with members of two prominent political clans in the city.

These personalities identified by Aguirre certainly have no love lost for President Duterte. But were they in Marawi to collaborate with the militant groups already entrenched in that city?

As this is being written, not one of the personalities named by Aguirre has come out to deny the information of their visit to a city now under heavy siege. None has yet surfaced to deny the insinuation they are collaborating with the enemies of the state to destabilize their own government.

Aguirre has yet to offer convincing details about this rather odd visit by opposition personalities to a city far from the usual tourism routes. This could be a stray accusation. But the personalities named by no less than the Justice Secretary should at least honor the implied accusation with a clear denial.

The visit by the four horsemen of the opposition and the outbreak of fighting could, in all possibility, be coincidental. But without a clear denial, the pro-Duterte social media channels will go to town with this.