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Topic |
BOI Report |
Senate report |
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Oplan Exodus planning and execution |
Mission planning defective due to poor analysis of area, unrealistic assumptions. |
Planners failed to adequately consider topography of area of operation. |
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There was absence of "abort criteria." |
No alternative exit routes were established and lack of abort criteria. |
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Concept of operations failed due to several factors. |
Oplan Exodus was "poorly planned and executed" and "intentionally" broke chain of command. |
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Breakdown of command and control at all levels due to ineffective communication. |
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Time on Target concept does not conform with established protocols of PNP. |
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Indications of failure to secure perimeter, conduct reconnaissance, occupy vantage points and establish observation posts. |
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Lack of intelligence |
There was "poor intelligence estimate." |
No preparation for possibility of 'pintakasi'. Only 392 personnel deployed while 1,000 hostile troops were present. |
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MILF's mortar capability unexpected. |
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Lack of equipment |
SAF commandos' radios unreliable, not designed for military-type tactical ops. |
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Lack of situational awareness, limited cover and concealment and ineffective communication. |
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Coordination with military |
Purisima's words construed as assurance of coordination instructed by Aquino. |
Purisima and Napeñas disregarded lateral coordination requirements. |
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Defective planning to due absence of prior coordination with AFP. |
"Most fatal mistake" was decision against prior coordination with AFP. |
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Artillery support requested from AFP not delivered due to peace protocols. |
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Description of the incident |
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A massacre not a misencounter. |
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Criminal offenses committed |
4 SAF commandos shot at close-range while still alive; indications of robbery. |
MILF, BIFF and other armed individuals committed murder and robbery. |
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No unlawful aggression that would justify self-defense was found. |
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MILF leadership |
Had loose command and control over their field forces, causing difficulty in reinstating the ceasefire. |
Does not have absolute control over their ground troops; no attempts to de-escalate the ongoing firefight. |
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Coordination with peace panel |
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Ceasefire mechanism failed to effectively end firefight of MILF with 55th Special Action Company but succeeded in containing firefight in Tukanalipao area. |
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Delay in information and intensity of the firefight gave MILF-GPH ceasefire mechanisms difficulty. |
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Presence of BIFF, private armed groups and armed civilians complicated the situation. |
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Defective planning to due absence of prior coordination with AHJAG. |
PNP-SAF did not attempt to coordinate with the AHJAG. |
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Chain of command |
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"Chain of command" principle applies to the PNP, contrary to DOJ reasoning. |
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Presence of suspended police chief Alan Purisima in "Exodus" briefing a violation of the chain of command. |
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President Aquino "bypassed" established chain of command of the PNP by dealing directly with Napeñas. |
President Aquino should have excluded Purisima. |
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General Purisima |
Violated Special Order 9851 directing suspended PNP officers to cease performing official functions. |
Violated Revised Penal Code Art 177 on usurpation of authority or official functions. |
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Provided inaccurate information to the president about actual situation on the ground. |
Acts constitute grave misconduct. |
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Violated Ombudsman's preventive suspension order. |
May be held in indirect contempt by the Ombudsman for "disobedience." |
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General Napeñas |
Violated chain of command in following Purisima's instructions not to tell Interior Sec. Mar Roxas and PNP IOC Espina. |
May be held administratively liable for grave misconduct. |
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Followed his Time on Target concept despite Aquino's directive to inform military. |
Liable for inefficiency and incompetence and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service. |
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President Aquino |
Allowed the participation of suspended police chief Purisima in the planning and execution of "Exodus." |
Failed to prevent Purisima's violations; fully aware of the suspension and did nothing to prevent his exercise of official functions. |
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Communication with Napeñas coursed through Purisima, to whom he gave instructions. |
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Gave the go-signal and allowed execution of "Exodus" after Napeñas' briefing. |
Approved "Exodus" with full knowledge of operational details; "ultimately responsible" for success, failure of mission. |
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Role of the United States |
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Cannot be readily dismissed as mere observers. |
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Involvement limited to intelligence sharing and medical evacuation. |
Supplied intelligence, equipment and training. |
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DFA's statement that "Exodus" was 100% percent Filipino contradicted by resource persons' statements. |
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ATC and NICA |
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The Anti-Terrorism Council and the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency should not have been left out. |
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Government peace panel |
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The OPAPP and the peace panel are "suffering from a wanton excess of optimism." They should start speaking for the country, not for the MILF. |
