It’s our war too

It was a decision that caught everyone by surprise. I’m referring to Vice President Leni Robredo’s acceptance of her appointment by President Rodrigo Duterte as co-chairperson of the Inter-Agency Committee on Anti-Illegal Drugs (ICAD).

It came at a time when the vice president’s political stock has been increasing of late, with survey numbers and the election protest going toward her favor. Those in the administration who underestimate Robredo as a leader are best advised to read literature about Robredo’s ascent “from zero to victory” in the vice presidential race. (In Cebu, Robredo, like Duterte, led by a wide margin against her rivals.) Observe also the body language of top-ranking military officers in the presence of the vice president.

But whatever the political undercurrents behind the decision of the president to offer to the vice president the job of “anti-drug czar” and the decision of the vice president to accept it, I hope we can set aside those things for now.

The war against illegal drugs is no political game, Robredo herself said. It could make or break her politically but that’s a lesser concern for the public right now. What matters most is that we must immediately roll up our sleeves and get the job done not just in the most efficient way, but also in the most effective way.

Experts have long made a distinction between efficiency and effectiveness in the drug war. Take for example the unprecedented violence – 4,948 drug users and dealers killed during police operations from July 1, 2016 to September 30, 2018, according to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) – it has barely made a dent in supply and demand.

The figures don’t even include the thousands murdered in the streets and in the slums by masked gunmen – at least 22,983 deaths classified by the police as “homicides under investigation,” according to Human Rights Watch.

The natural tendency under the Duterte doctrine is to do more of the same – with more intensity and relentlessness. Police and PDEA agents are called upon to conduct more anti-drug operations with improved efficiency. PDEA director general Aaron Aquino even challenged Vice President Robredo to join in anti-drug operations, a misguided suggestion that was shot down immediately.

True, the intensified drug campaign under the Duterte administration has led to measurable and short-term success – increase in the number of arrested drug peddlers and users, high-level drug dealers killed (the financiers remain scot-free), and large volumes of shabu seized. But why did this intensified and relentless campaign still fail to lick the problem of drug addiction and even made it worse?

Because there has always been a tendency to focus on the number of players killed, the number of arrests, and the volume of drugs seized. We have lost track of the institutional effectiveness in meeting the ultimate objective of the drug war – to reduce supply and demand.

Reports of battles fought and drugs seized off the market are good propaganda material to create an illusion of action and progress. Yet the volume of drugs supplied to slums and decrepit communities continue to flow under the nose of corrupt officials and clueless, disempowered citizens.

In the words of Andreas, Bertram, Blachman and Sharpe (Dead-end Drug Wars, 1992), “with such measures, there is no failure, only milestones that fail to mark progress toward any meaningful goal.”

No level of political will and law enforcement ability can solve the drug problem unless we make this war the community’s own war – less destructive to human life, to democratic institutions, and to the community’s sense of decency.