Conclusive

In this case of the spouses Ferdie and Myrna the principle of res judicata is again applied.

The case involves a 349 square meter lot with a ten-door apartment covered by TCT No. 156156 that a development corporation (MIDCOM) sold to Ferdie and Myrna pursuant to a Contract to Sell dated August 20, 1984 for the amount of P480,000 payable P150,000 down and the balance of P330,000 in three monthly installments. Out of the total purchase price, Ferdie and Myrna were able to pay P410,000 leaving a balance of P70,000.

However, on October 1, 1984, MIDCOM again sold the same property to Sonia and Dely for P630,000 under a Deed of Absolute Sale and later informed Ferdie and Myrna that they had already rescinded their Contract to Sell.

So on October 22, 1984, Ferdie and Myrna filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC Branch 29) against MIDCOM, its president, Mike, Sonia and the Register of Deeds (RD) praying that MIDCOM be compelled to execute a Deed of Sale in their favor upon their payment of the balance of the purchase price. The spouses also asked that the RD be enjoined from registering the Deed of Sale and issuing a new title in favor of Sonia and Dely. But despite the restraining order of the RTC, a new title (TCT No. 164726) was still issued in the name of “Sonia married to Bob”, and in the name of Dely.

On October 7, 1986, the RTC Br. 29 rendered a decision in favor of Ferdie and Myrna, ordering MIDCOM to execute the necessary Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor upon payment of the P70,000 balance. It also ordered Sonia to turn over and deliver the TCT 164726 issued to her for its cancellation by the RD and for issuance of another title in favor of Myrna and Ferdie. The RTC also declared Mike, Sonia and the RD in contempt and fined them P100 each for violation of the restraining order. MIDCOM and Sonia was also ordered to pay damages.

Upon finality of the said decision, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC Br. 29 on August 16, 1990. TCT 164726 was therefore cancelled and TCT 195378 was issued in the names of Ferdie and Myrna on January 22, 1991. On January 23, 1991, the spouses mortgage the property in favor of PNB for P5 million.

But on February 29, 1991, Sonia and her husband Bob as well as Dely filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari praying that said RTC Br. 29 decision be declared void for lack of jurisdiction since Bob and Dely were not made parties therein. The CA however dismissed their petition with finality on June 14, 1991.

Then on August 2, 1991 Dely and Bob later joined by Sonia filed another complaint in the RTC Br. 3 for quieting of title and/or re-conveyance with damages claiming that the decision of RTC Br. 29 beclouded their title to the property.

On August 27, 1991, Dely joined Bob and Sonia in filing still another petition with the CA for annulment of the RTC Br. 29 decision and writ of execution allegedly for her non-inclusion as indispensable party. But the CA also denied this petition on the ground that Dely had no right to the property when the complaint was filed in the RTC Br. 29. This dismissal became final after the SC itself affirmed the CA ruling.

Meantime on August 29, 1994, the RTC Br. 3 also rendered a decision dismissing the action of Bob, Dely and Sonia for quieting of title and re-conveyance on the ground it is already barred by the principle of res judicata. But on appeal to the CA, the latter reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA said that the RTC Br. 29 decision cannot bind Dely who was not made a party therein despite being a co-owner of the property. Was the CA correct?

No. In their action for quieting of title and re-conveyance filed with the RTC Br. 3, Bob, Sonia and Dely insist that the RTC Br. 29 decision is null and void for failure to implead Dely and Bob as indispensable parties. However these arguments have already been raised, passed upon and rejected with finality in the two previous decisions of the CA. Hence the second aspect res judicata, which is “conclusiveness of judgment”, applies.

Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties even if the later suit may involve a different claim or cause of action. In this case, conclusiveness of judgment exist because Bob and Dely again seek to enforce their right or title over the same litigated property basing their claim on the nullity of the RTC Br. 29 decision for failure to implead them therein as indispensable parties which had been overruled by final judgments of the CA. The same question cannot be raised again even in a different proceeding involving the same parties (PNB vs. Sia and Ngo, G.R. 165836).     

Note: Books containing compilation of my articles on Labor Law and Criminal Law (Vols. I and II) are now available. Call tel. 7249445.

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