What China means by ‘few more days’

IT WAS right that President Rodrigo Duterte stepped back and clarified that the Philippines is not severing relations with its long-time ally the United States – since nobody knows if/when China leaders would make good the promises they had made to him.

One major promise still wrapped in uncertainty is for China to reopen Panatag (Scarborough) shoal off Zambales to Filipino fishermen whom it has barred from their traditional fishing ground since 2012.

In a statement in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, last Sunday, the President assured Filipino fishermen that “in a few more days” China would allow them to cast their nets again in the lagoon of Panatag. That was welcome news, except that:

• To China which has a long sweep of time, “a few more days” could be a year or even a generation – much like in its waiting confidently for Taiwan the renegade province to fall, in time, like a ripe fruit.

• The Chinese made sure the promise to allow Filipinos back to Panatag was not in the joint statement of China President Xi Jinping and President Duterte documenting the highlights of his recent state visit. Why did they leave out that point?

• Confining Filipinos to the lagoon, described by Duterte as a spawning area, would limit their harvest since nobody must disturb waters and corals where fish feed and breed, and nurture their fry.

• It is still not clear who will manage the common fishing and under what terms and conditions. Does the Philippines have any say on these matters?

There is a clear need to explain the President’s announcement in Tuguegarao: “We’ll just wait for a few more days. We may be able to return to the Scarborough (Panatag) shoal and our countrymen may be able to fish there again.”

• Beijing now getting confused too?

AFTER Washington, it may now be the turn of Beijing to ask for clarification of President Duterte’s intentions and of the Philippine government’s long-term relationship with its neighbor.

The President may be outside Chinese air space now, but still within earshot. His new BFF in Beijing may want to know the meaning of “separating militarily and economically” from the US and “severance of ties” that Duterte declares still bind.

When businessmen in a banquet last Oct. 20 in the Great Hall of the People applauded Duterte’s announced “separation” from the US and his “realignment (to) your ideological flow,” he was so carried away that he went overboard: “So I will be dependent on you for all time!”

On US ties, Foreign Secretary Perfecto Yasay may have to explain again to the President why a national leader does not just walk away from treaty commitments while under the influence of a sumptuous Chinese lauriat.

Heads of government cannot waste one another’s time by blurting out a policy sea change one day and spending the next couple of days explaining what it really meant and did not mean.

Kung sabagay, some tacticians deliberately try to confuse the enemy, regardless of their own state of confusion. Was Duterte intentionally fibbing or just could not find the precise phraseology to convey his thoughts on relationships?

The President’s advisers should have given him a complete and balanced view of relations with China and the US so he did not have to fall back for guidance on his historical sentimiento and unpleasant experience with US immigration types.

By this time, Duterte should have learned also why it is not advisable to make extemporaneous remarks about other nations and their leaders – unless one has consummate communication skills for it.

When required during a foreign trip – as in his coming visit to Japan – to make extended statements that will be quoted in media and inscribed in official documents, President Duterte should play it safe and confine himself to reading from prepared statements.

• Misconceptions on arbitral award

NOW and then, we will run a Q&A based on our exchange with lawyer Mario E. Valderrama, founder and first president of the Philippine Institute of Arbitrators, on the arbitral tribunal award and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. We have clipped his responses to fit space.

Q: Cite some “misconceptions” on South China Sea issues.

A: One misconception is that Phl owns its Exclusive Economic Zone. The grant is sovereign economic rights over marine and mineral resources, not ownership of the EEZ itself. The grant is subject to the legal regime provided in UNCLOS. The jurisdiction of a coastal state to establish and use artificial islands, installations and structures, including the exclusive right to authorize or regulate the construction of structures is limited and should be in relation to its sovereign rights over living and non-living resources in its EEZ and does not extend to sovereignty over the airspace, water column or the seabed.

The distinction is very important. Military activities within the EEZ is permissible, as long as they do not unduly interfere with the coastal state’s economic rights over the resources.

Another misconception is that Phl owns the reefs in the West Philippine Sea. Reefs are part of the seabed and are not capable of ownership by anybody. Contrary to popular belief, another state (China in this case) may use reefs if doing so would not unduly interfere with Phl’s exercise of its economic rights.

China’s development of Mischief Reef, however, is of such magnitude that it interferes with Phl’s exercise of its economic rights. Even then, such development is not necessarily unlawful. China can do it if Phl were to give its consent. The Tribunal faulted China not because it developed Mischief Reef, but because China did not get Phl’s prior consent.

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