Missing the point on EDCA

Retired Ambassador to the US, Raul Ch. Rabe has agreed to publish his personal views on EDCA based on his professional experience as a diplomat, once involved in previous negotiations with the United States. I believe he states his views objectively and devoid of any hidden ideology or political agenda.

Bean counting to assess the value to our national interest of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) will not produce a fair and objective result. In fact, it will lead us, as it has done to several of our media commentators, to miss the point.

We should start from a broader and historical perspective.

The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) was signed when the perceived threat to both the Philippines and the United States was seen as coming from the Pacific. It has only been recent that China and the South China Sea have entered the picture and the threat direction, particularly for the Philippines, is now seen as from the West. 

With the failure of the Philippine Senate to ratify the modified Military Base Agreement of 1991, the US pulled out from both Clark and Subic, leaving the South China Sea and other areas in our region unpatrolled, wide open, and inviting.  It was not long after that Mischief Reef was occupied by the Chinese and China started a more aggressive assertion of its Nine-Dash Line claim over practically the entire South China Sea, extending now to the Japanese Senkaku islands (Diaoyu in China), a veritable tenth line. Hubris and rising nationalism, particularly among China’s youth, have fueled the change from “peaceful rise” and “charm offensive” into China’s current irredentist policy, never mind what its neighbors and the rest of the world think. Not surprising really as China sees the South China Sea as a source of needed resources, including oil and gas and, more important, China also looks at its coastal areas as its “soft underbelly” defense-wise. Hence, the need to control the waters around it.

Aquino Call for ASEAN Solidarity

Neighboring countries of China, given its recent actions (the latest being the encounter with Vietnam over the Chinese drilling rig in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone), have either welcomed the US “pivot to Asia” or at least have not expressed any objection to it. President Aquino’s call for ASEAN solidarity on the South China Sea and the need to follow the rule of law resonated well in the recent ASEAN Summit in Myanmar, a call supported by the US The enhancement of our defense cooperation with the US, on the other hand, makes it clear that we take a favorable view of the US presence in Asia.

US Presence: Balancing Factor to China

It is curious that many see the value to the Philippines of the US presence in our region solely on the military commitment of the US under the MDT. The US presence actually serves as a “balancing” factor to China in more ways than one.

The US, because of its superpower status and its high degree of economic interdependence with China, is in a unique position to influence China into becoming a peaceful and responsible state.

We all know that the US is the biggest debtor of China, with over a trillion dollars China has invested in US treasuries. The US is also the biggest market for China’s consumable goods and is, therefore, China’s biggest source of revenues. The US debt to China, seen by many as hampering the US ability to confront China, actually adds to its ability to engage and resolve issues with China. Where the peace was kept during the Cold War because the US and Russia had nuclear arsenals which assured mutual destruction in case of conflict, the situation with China now has an added dimension-assured mutual destruction in both military and economic terms. The region, as well as the Philippines, should appreciate, not denigrate, this complex relationship which is the real key for eventual peace and stability in our region, not solely US military might. In fact, there is also a lesson here for the Philippines as we try to manage our relations with China, our dispute notwithstanding.

Obama: “Ironclad Guarantee”

We have long clamored for a more definitive policy pronouncement from our treaty ally on what the MDT covers. An assurance was made in 1979 by US Secretary State Cyrus Vance that the MDT will cover “an attack on Philippine armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific and would not have to occur within the metropolitan territory of the Philippines or island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific in order to come within the definition of Pacific area in Article V (of the MDT)”. This was then further clarified in 1999 by a statement of US Defense Secretary William Cohen that “the US considers the South China Sea to be part of the Pacific Area.”

However, critics of our alliance with the US continue to hammer on the need for clarity, an issue pushed to the front by President Obama’s categorical statement during his recent visit to the region that the Senkaku Islands are covered by the US-Japan Defense Treaty. President Obama’s failure to give the same specific assurance to the Philippines over the West Philippine Sea has given fuel to the MDT critics who are now using this argument against the EDCA, notwithstanding President Obama’s “ironclad” guarantee to defend the Philippines.

The MDT, granting for the sake of argument that it is ambiguous over its coverage of our West Philippine Sea dispute with China, viewed from any angle, is still currently our best and only option.

It is within this security context that the EDCA was negotiated. EDCA is not a “stand alone” agreement. It is anchored on the MDT and expands on the implementation of the Visiting Forces Agreement of 1998 (VFA). It is also essentially a bilateral military arrangement. It seeks to expand our military cooperation with the US by allowing enhanced “rotational presence” of US troops in “agreed locations” (to be mutually determined between our defense establishments) as well as the prepositioning of defense materiel and, equally important, disaster relief goods and equipment. The EDCA thus improves the US ability to deploy forces and to react immediately in case of natural disasters. It actualizes, in a real way, what is envisioned in the MDT.

EDCA: In Favor of US Only???

A recent government handout lists the following benefits that EDCA brings to the table:

a. Interoperability;

b. Capacity building towards AFP modernization;

c. Strengthening the AFP for external defense;

d. Maritime security;

e. Maritime domain awareness; and

f. Humanitarian assistance and disaster response.

Because they are expressed in military jargon, they are not easily understood or appreciated. Thus, some of our commentators have missed their real value to our defense establishment and defense posture (or intentionally excluded them from their equation) when they conclude that the EDCA is lopsided in favor of the US and gives no benefit to us.

Interoperability with the forces of our ally through joint exercises is vital in case of a conflict situation. Training in US equipment is useful because we obtain an annual stream of US military assistance for equipment and supplies.

A program to install radar stations in Palawan and other areas facing the West Philippine Sea is another example of the benefit of being a US treaty ally. These radar stations will enhance our air and maritime security, enabling us to “see” far and wide into the West Philippine Sea. This falls under what is cryptically termed in the government handout as “Maritime Domain awareness”.

The prepositioned defense materiel, owned by the US forces, will enable US forces to rotate quickly to the Philippines without having to carry their heavy luggage. Granted, this benefits the US forces but it is implied in EDCA, and also but logical, that in case an “MDT situation” arises, these defense materiel may be made available for the use of our forces. Important because in a shooting war, our inventory of bullets and equipment will last for only a few days. Note that Article IV, par. 2 of EDCA states “the Parties also recognize the value of such prepositioning to the enhancement of their individual and collective defense capabilities” (underlining mine). During peace time, the EDCA (Art V, par. 5) also provides that “the Parties may consult regarding the possible transfer or purchase of equipment determined to be excess, as may be allowed by United States laws and regulations”.

The value of the prepositioned disaster relief equipment, supplies, and material to aid our countrymen during natural disasters need not be elucidated. We saw how US assistance in the aftermath of Typhoon Yolanda saved lives and mitigated the plight of thousands in the affected areas. The ability to deploy these relief goods and equipment from a nearby site means a shorter response time so vital in saving lives.

The US has committed to construct facilities for US troops in the “agreed locations” within the AFP bases. These will include barracks for their temporary stay as well as the construction or improvement of airfields and ports which will be for joint use under EDCA. Economic opportunities will also open up for Filipino suppliers of goods and services.

More than Cash

While it may be possible to attach a monetary value to the equipment that the US will give to us, as well as the facilities and infrastructure that they will build, a lot more cannot be so determined because they are intangibles, and beyond commerce, so to speak. The skills and experience that our own soldiers can acquire as they exercise with US forces, the skills which our tank and amphibious landing craft drivers will absorb by being allowed to practice on US equipment, the skills which our pilots will learn as they exercise in aerial “dog-fights” (with US jet fighters when we get our Korean T-50 trainer jets), and the military tactics that our commanders will absorb, to name a few, obviously cannot be quantified

Thus, our alliance gives our country a real “security umbrella”. That this is of immense value is shown by the willingness of Japan and Korea to shoulder the bulk (up to some 80 to 85 percent) of the cost of the US presence within their borders.

Pivot to Asia: Multi-faceted

Lest it be overlooked, it should also be pointed out that the US “pivot” to Asia, although initially stated in military terms, is multi-faceted. The US is campaigning for accession by Asian countries to its Trans-Pacific Partnership program, an economic arrangement to open wide trade and investment flows between partners. This is a recognition, as well, of the opportunities Asia presents in the economic sphere. The Philippines may not yet be ready for this partnership however as we need to liberalize some of the economic provisions in our Constitution. This notwithstanding, President Obama announced in his Manila visit that the US Secretary of Commerce will be heading a trade and investment mission which will visit the Philippines in the next few months.

We are now living in an interesting and different time and our mindset as a nation is no longer what it was when the US bases were here. Then we became overly reliant. Now, our goal is firmly to develop our own credible defense capability. The EDCA, and its predecessor agreements, buys us time, as well as outside assistance, as we move forward in engaging China in constructive and mutually beneficial ways. As has been wisely said, our dispute with China in the West Philippine Sea is not the totality of our relationship.

(To be Continued)