(Last of two parts)
Has RA 8292 improved the governance of public universities? Has the selection process been depoliticized, and are we getting more qualified and better-performing SUC presidents?
In my last column, I highlighted well-performing representatives on the House and Senate committees on higher education in SUC governing boards. I also recounted horror stories about representatives who viewed their membership in BOR/BOT as a means to push their favored candidates for SUC president, recommend students for admission regardless of their qualifications, secure infrastructure projects for their preferred contractors or influence (even dictate) the appointment of deans and faculty.
It appears that the transfer of authority from the Philippine president to the SUC governing board has democratized the selection of SUC presidents but not depoliticized it.
The qualification requirements have improved and the metrics for evaluating candidates are well-defined and measurable, as outlined in the IRR of RA 8292. Yet the most qualified candidates do not always win.
In my experience sitting as Board of Regents chairman for more than nine years, I have noted the following:
1. Many of the well-established, high-performing and specialized SUCs are often immune to political interference, and the best candidates score well in the search process and are appointed as president.
There is a strong correlation between less politicized selection processes and SUCs’ ability to improve and grow.
2. While some selection processes may be politicized, many public universities will flourish when politicians refrain from interfering in SUC governance after a president is selected.
3. Smaller SUCs and those in regions with widespread political dynasties tend to be the most politicized. Candidates lacking endorsement from politicians are often overlooked by their governing boards.
4. Many SUCs continue to select their presidents in a parochial and inward-looking manner. Typically, they prefer candidates who are alumni or officials of the SUC, hail from their province or belong to the dominant ethnic group. “Outsider candidates” are viewed with suspicion and do not fare well in the selection process unless there are few or weak “insider candidates.”
This narrow-minded perspective is shaped by local politicians from the House and Senate, sectoral representatives within the SUC and private sector representatives. Collectively, these three groups already possess six out of eleven votes needed to choose a president.
5. CHED officials (chairperson, commissioners and regional directors) are not immune to the politicization of SUCs. Certain officials have become notorious for backing their protégés’ candidacies and openly supporting them during searches and selections. Some behave like politicians, advising current presidents against seeking a second term because they have already pledged the position to their favored candidates.
6. The process of selecting SUC presidents becomes highly politicized following an election, as many newly elected politicians try to replace incumbent presidents with their allies.
All these factors influence the governance of SUCs. Anito, Marasigan and Reyes, in their Philippine STAR article titled “The Quiet Normalization of Patronage in SUCs” (2026), warn that patronage in higher education is increasingly accepted as normal. They contend that in some SUCs, patronage no longer appears as overt interference but is instead framed in institutional language as pragmatic, necessary and a mark of professional maturity.
They assert that once faculty, students and the academic community start to consider political mediation as a normal part of appointments, leadership contests or academic priorities, patronage becomes embedded in the accepted norms of a university.
So where do we go from here?
Initially, we expect that the leadership of the House and Senate will appoint chairpersons of the committees on higher education who possess both academic credentials and expertise in higher education, not merely because they are political allies.
Alongside Shahani, senator Juan Flavier served as an outstanding chair of the committee on higher education during the Arroyo administration. He appointed academics and his Senate staff as his representatives on the SUC governing boards. He empowered them and rarely intervened in decision-making. I knew this firsthand because I represented him at public universities in Region I and closely followed his directives to keep the SUCs free from political influence.
Another good example is former representative (now governor) Ann Hofer, who earned a Doctor of Public Administration degree from UP NCPAG and effectively led the House committee during her term.
Unfortunately, these are the exceptions rather than the rule.
Second, we need Senate and House committee chairs who rigorously enforce the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8292. Although CHED has provided detailed guidelines for selecting and supervising the designated House and Senate members on the SUC governing boards, these guidelines are often ignored because committee chairs fail to ensure their representatives comply with the requirements.
Third, let’s hope Acidre and Adiong’s proposal to mandate governance certification and training for board members works in practice. The idea is sound, but I don’t think it’s practical or enforceable. Can CHED actually require politicians to attend certification programs?
Or why don’t we go back to the practice of letting the Philippine president appoint SUC presidents?
Will these realities on the ground be thoroughly discussed in the committee and plenary debates in Congress to improve the amendments to RA 8292?
I don’t think we should hold our breath. It’s like asking Dracula to watch over the blood bank.