The past few weeks, our diplomatic relations with China appear to have deteriorated into a war of angry press releases, spiced with travel bans.
The Chinese embassy in Manila has stepped up its public diplomacy, issuing toe-to-toe responses every public issuance from Philippine officials at any level – emulating the “wolf warrior” style now preferred in Beijing. The Philippine Coast Guard has been equally relentless in its verbal attacks about China’s “gray tactics” in the contested waters – and often straying into the domain of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).
Beijing escalated its responses. It banned local officials from Kalayaan, Palawan from entering China. This township, as we know, is an artificial settlement to populate at least one of the contested marine features in the South China Sea.
Last week, Beijing banned our Defense Secretary, Gilbert Teodoro, and his immediate family from going to China. This was after Teodoro made strong statements about China during a high profile security forum held in Singapore. This is an unprecedented measure.
By some wonderful coincidence, someone crawled out of the woodwork to question Teodoro’s citizenship. As some point, it turns out, Teodoro held Maltese citizenship or at least carried a Maltese passport.
Manila’s preferred style of diplomatic engagement with Beijing has not found favor with the other members of the ASEAN. They have long suspected us of being Latino in sentiment and only Asian by geography. We did not conform with the “Asian” style of diplomatic engagement: quiet and consensual rather than candid and confrontational.
I had personal experience with this. When the Philippines filed an arbitration case against China, I was invited for tea with the Chinese ambassador. I received a stern lecture on why friends and neighbors should not drag each other to court – even as I pleaded with the ambassador that I was merely an opinion writer and not a policymaker.
Our ASEAN colleagues are always polite. But it was clear they are uncomfortable with the head-to-head style of diplomatic engagement the Philippines preferred – possibly dictated by the expectations of the domestic audience. Our blaring claims of sovereign rights over marine features in the South China Sea that fall within our exclusive economic zone was never overtly endorsed in ASEAN forums.
Last week, on the 10th anniversary of arbitral court ruling upholding Philippine claims, someone from the ASEAN community finally broke the uncomfortable silence. Former Malaysian foreign minister Saifuddin Abdullah warned that Manila’s decision to revive and internationalize the arbitration ruling contributed to regional tensions, invited foreign intervention and undermined ASEAN centrality. He urged the Philippines to embrace “quiet diplomacy” and warned against “making too much noise.”
ASEAN was speaking to us in its usual discreet manner: using a retired minister to convey the message. This minimizes ruffling feathers and helps save face. It has deniability built into it. Although not the association’s “official” position, it is undoubtedly the ASEAN speaking to us.
Malaysia is, of course, not a neutral observer in the South China Sea squabbles. The country is a contestant in the area. For decades, Kuala Lumpur has expanded and consolidated its presence in the southern Spratlys.
The country occupies several maritime features that fall within Manila’s exclusive economic zone as defined by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Some of these outposts have undergone reclamation and host some military presence – although marginal when compared to China’s massive island-building effort.
Kuala Lumpur has been more openly critical of the Philippines for asserting its maritime rights by insisting on the full application of international law. At the same time, Malaysia has strengthened its physical presence on disputed features – constantly insisting that all discussions about them remain behind closed doors.
It might sound reasonable enough that our ASEAN partners insist on “quiet” diplomacy. It must be noted, however, that Malaysia itself repeatedly rejected China’s maritime claims and on several instances filed diplomatic protests concerning China’s incursions into what it claims are its waters.
Our neighbors, those with outstanding claims to the South China Sea maritime features, are not subjected to daily acts of bullying by the China Coast Guard and its sprawling “maritime militia.” The domestic constituencies of our ASEAN partners are not as insistent about defending territorial claims.
Then there is the matter of Philippine claims to Sabah.
In 2024, Malaysia strongly protested Manila’s submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The Philippine continental shelf projection partly relies on baselines connected to Sabah. In Its protest, Kuala Lumpur described its sovereignty over Sabah as “indisputable.” Manila’s submission in this regard has apparently caused some discomfort in Kuala Lumpur.
The Philippines and Malaysia are staunch partners. We share in the vision of an ASEAN community. But we do have our territorial disputes. Relegating our Sabah claim to “quiet” diplomacy got us nowhere.
Nevertheless, it would be useful for Manila to constantly keep our partners in the ASEAN in mind as we pursue our own path to diplomatic resolution of overlapping territorial claims. Our regional community is a precious thing. Our neighbors have a keener regard for quiet consensus-building than we might sometimes have.
China has been more stringent in asserting its territorial claims vis-a-vis the Philippines. This could be due to our overt alliance with the US.
The conduct of our diplomacy is partly shaped by the jingoism of our politicians.