Taiwan’s tough talk raises the cross-strait temperature

China has been squeezing Taiwan for years. President Xi Jinping has made reunification a key pillar of his nationalist agenda and ordered the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready to seize the island by 2027. But since Taiwan’s pro-independence president William Lai took office in January 2024, the vise has tightened, with air and naval incursions into Taiwan’s air defense zone a daily occurrence.

Early on, President Lai responded cautiously and avoided riling Beijing unnecessarily, seeing no reason to jeopardize Taiwan’s strong economy and his high approval ratings. But Lai’s rhetoric against the mainland has become increasingly confrontational in recent months. On March 13, he delivered a speech in which he proposed 17 steps Taiwan should take to counter threats posed by China and its bid to infiltrate the Taiwanese government and society. And since June 22, Lai has delivered three of 10 planned “national unity” speeches asserting Taiwan’s centuries-long cultural, political and historical independence from China, urging citizens to unite against communism and fight against the threat of Chinese annexation, and warning that Beijing is trying to erase Taiwanese national identity.

Why now? Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) controls the presidency but not the legislature, where the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party won a thin majority in January. The opposition has since slashed the budget and rammed through bills to clip the executive’s wings while expanding the powers of the KMT-controlled parliament. Unable to pass laws, the DPP is backing a July 26 recall vote against dozens of KMT lawmakers in the hopes of flipping at least six seats and regaining its legislative majority. Lai’s remarks are designed to whip up nationalist fervor and paint the KMT, which advocates for more conciliatory policies toward Beijing, as a fifth column working against Taiwan’s best interests.

But if for Lai they are domestic politics, for China’s leaders they are fighting words – and they are raising the temperature in the Taiwan Strait.

Beijing won’t let the provocations slide. Chinese officials have already blasted Lai’s rhetoric as a “Taiwan-independence manifesto” and state media warned of “self-destruction.” While Xi may wait until Lai has delivered all 10 speeches before launching a response, military planners are surely drafting large-scale military exercises modeled on the live-fire show that followed former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit. Expect missile tests over the island, flotillas encircling it and coast-guard “inspections” of Taiwanese civilian vessels that could disrupt commercial shipping if Beijing decides to prolong the exercise.

Beijing will be tempted to go even bolder, but it’ll be deterred by the wildcard that is President Donald Trump’s response function. Though the US Congress, the Pentagon and much of Trump’s Cabinet remain staunch China hawks, Chinese leaders see the president’s isolationist tendencies and personal disinterest in Taiwan as a sign that US backlash to grey-zone moves may be muted. But Trump is nothing if not unpredictable (see: Iran), and Beijing must weigh whether punishing Lai too harshly could provoke a strong US counter-move.

That’s one of the reasons why a full-scale invasion of the self-ruled island isn’t happening in the near term. Xi Jinping still believes time is on his side. Why gamble everything now when the military balance keeps tilting in China’s way and Taiwan’s own politics might eventually deliver a more unification-friendly leadership? Possibly the most complex military operation in history, an amphibious assault on Taiwan would risk catastrophic losses and global sanctions amid an ongoing economic slowdown. The coercive squeeze already underway – a combination of economic, diplomatic and “grey-zone” military pressure – is a far safer bet while still offering plenty of incremental ratchet points.

For Lai, the political upside of talking tough currently outweighs the downside. Chinese saber-rattling chips away at Taiwan’s sovereignty, but it also rallies Taiwanese voters and Western allies in support of the DPP and the island’s defense.

What to watch over the next month? First, Lai’s remaining speeches, especially the sixth, which is set to touch directly on cross-strait relations. Each new riff will give Beijing another pretext to flex. Second, the scale and scope of Beijing’s military response – missile envelope, exclusion zones, coast-guard operations. Third, any cues from Washington – statements, naval presence in the South China Sea, congressional delegations to Taipei, fresh arms sales, trade deals with either side – that might stiffen or soften Xi’s posture. Finally, Taiwan’s July 26 recall vote. If the DPP flips six seats and regains the legislature, Lai will have fewer incentives to reach for the nationalist megaphone; if it falls short, expect the volume – and the danger – to stay at 9.5.

The bottom line is a volatile and unstable equilibrium. Neither side wants war; both find utility in controlled provocation. The danger is that “controlled” can quickly turn into “runaway” in a fog of mistrust, miscalculation or plain bad luck. Until Beijing and Taipei find a way back to quieter politics, the 110nautical-mile strait between them will remain a live wire.