Realignment

Rodrigo Duterte decided to realign our foreign policy with a distinct pro-China tilt. In fact, he imagined forming a Manila-Moscow-Beijing axis that will challenge the dominance of the western powers.

This did not work out very well for us. We did not recover open access to the Scarborough (Panatag) Shoal. Our puny maritime defense was bullied at every turn by China’s coast guard and marine militia in the contested South China Sea. We did not progress in our urgently needed natural gas exploration in waters that fall within Beijing’s ridiculous “9-dash line.” We hardly progressed in strengthening our external defense capacity.

China, for obvious reasons, had no interest in helping us upgrade our defense capability. Our traditional security partners, anxious over our apparent wavering, offered little help. Our navy seemed dead in the water.

Meanwhile, Russia invaded Ukraine, illegally annexing parts of her neighbor’s territory. That drew global condemnation and invited stiff economic sanctions that now threaten to leave Russia economically isolated.

Under Duterte, we hesitated clearly condemning Russia’s military adventure. We did not actively participate in enforcing trade sanctions. Our foreign policy seemed out of kilter, aligning us with tyrannical regimes and forcing us outside the mainstream of nations supporting an international order based on the rule of law. Furthermore, we came under intense international pressure to conform to the economic sanctions enforced against Russia.

Clearly, the Manila-Moscow-Beijing axis was an idea whose time will never come. It was a dream that could quickly turn into a nightmare. It gave us no strategic leverage; only obeisance.

Fortunately, our professional diplomats kept us from slipping down the slippery slope of Duterte’s wild imaginings. At the United Nations General Assembly, we voted twice with the large majority of nations condemning Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine. We continued our efforts to achieve climate justice in international fora. We kept our participation in international efforts that would create free trade areas beneficial for our economic development. To the extent possible, given the detour in our foreign policy directions, our diplomats reaffirmed our principled commitment to a future of democracy and open economies.

Towards the end of his term, Duterte reversed the suspension of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). He had threatened to revoke that agreement during a moment of spite and not as the outcome of a careful assessment of the country’s strategic options.

Our ability to forge joint ventures for joint exploration and mutual benefit of possible gas deposits in the South China Sea remains constrained, however. The Supreme Court appears inclined to view such arrangements as unconstitutional. There has been little indication interest from either Beijing or Hanoi regarding such ventures. Meanwhile, our energy sufficiency is constricted by the exhaustion of the Malampaya wells.

In less than a year since Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. took office, our foreign relations appear to have been restored to their former and pleasantly pragmatic state. No time was lost reinvigorating our mutual defense relations with the US. Earlier this month, Filipino and American troops held the largest joint exercises ever. Before that, we agreed to add four more sites for possible use by US forces within the framework of our Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.

It may be said that the Philippines returned to its place in defending open shipping routes and opposing aggression in the region. We are, after all, an indispensable part of the island chain extending from Japan through Taiwan and our archipelago down to the Malacca Straits. This chain, and its capacity to fight aggression, is important to discourage Beijing from any senseless adventure it might entertain.

Of course we value trade with China. It is almost central to any model of Philippine economic progress.

But we also value the security of the shipping routes threatened by China’s expansionary territorial claims. They are the lifeblood of East and Southeast Asia’s dynamic economies. We do not want to see freedom of navigation in these shipping routes threatened by China’s senseless maritime maneuvers – nor by her surrogate North Korea’s obsession with firing long-range missiles into international waters.

For a while, we threatened to become the weakest link in this strategic island chain – in part, because of delusory foreign policy design and in part because of our own parochialism. Geopolitics dictate we carry our own weight in keeping this chain strong. Our own security depends on it.

Those political voices opposing the additional facilities granted US forces insist we should play no part in defending freedom of navigation nor in protecting Taiwan’s right to self-determination. These voices reject the very real responsibilities assigned us by geography and by geopolitics.

Securing freedom of navigation in the seas around us is vital for our future. It is not something we should assign to others but not to ourselves. We cannot allow Beijing’s penchant to have a controlling role down the whole length of the Western Pacific.

China’s frantic build-up of its navy and its outlandish territorial claims will only result in a greater ability to constrict the trade routes. On the basis of that ability, Beijing could exact diplomatic concessions from its neighbors. The only way to counter that is to strengthen security partnerships among nations committed to free navigation and open trade.

There is nothing pro-American in affirming the need to keep the island chain strong and freedom of navigation secure. It is entirely pro-Filipino.

We have realigned our foreign policy to suit our pragmatic and long-term interests. That can only be good.