6 ways to secure electronic voting

Fourteen years since passage, the 2007 Automated Election System Law has no implementing rules and regulations. The Comelec only issued resolutions for balloting in 2010, 2013, 2016 and 2019.

The resolutions were disparate, specific to exigencies. Not a few were contradictory stopgaps. Absent were experts’ inputs from other agencies and the public that the Administrative Code requires. Mistakes were inevitable, some even breaking the very AES Law.

Examples: In April 2016 Comelec had to replace a two-month-old resolution. That was after the Supreme Court ordered it to enable the vote verification feature of the counting machines. In 2010 Comelec deactivated the digital signature system of precinct inspectors. It was a direct breach of the law’s section on authenticating precinct results for electronic transmission to canvassing centers.

Also in 2016 Comelec forbade cameras, cellphones and other image capturing devices inside precincts. That contravened the provision allowing any person to view and photograph election returns and certificates of canvass. Partially correcting itself in 2019, Comelec allowed poll watchers to take pictures of proceedings and incidents during machine testing and sealing, vote counting, transmission and printing of precinct returns.

Two election watchdogs pointed out these issues recently to Comelec commissioners. With only six months till Election Day, it may be impossible to craft IRRs. The Network for Justice and Compassion (NetJC) and the Tagapagtanggol ng Watawat Inc. (TNWI) proposed six ways to make Election 2022 fair, honest and transparent. One Comelec resolution can incorporate the proposals gathered from public consultations:

• Expand to all citizens, not only to poll watchers, the option to photograph election returns and certificates of canvass. The AES Law upholds such right.

• Install a virtual tally board per precinct. That will assure that the votes in the receipt – or voter verifiable paper audit trail – do not just reflect the voters’ choices but are actually counted. At present the machine only spits out the VVPAT for the voter to check that his choices were actually registered, but he cannot know if counted after dropping it into the receipt box.

• The Random Manual Audit should be done publicly immediately after polls close. RMA guidelines should be published well beforehand, and the random selection of precincts be public too. The RMA is an accuracy check of the counting machines. In 2019 one precinct per congressional district or city was chosen for audit. In Metro Manila it was done several days after the balloting. Doubts arose about where the ballots were stored and if secured at all.

• Clarify the secure communication channels to be used along with authentication and codification procedures in electronic transmission of precinct results to canvassing centers. Comelec must consider all interested watchdogs to be given access to all system logs. That can guarantee integrity and transparency of transmission up to the National Board of Canvassers and its disaster recovery sites. Section 7 of the AES Law, amended by R.A. No. 9369, requires all electronic transmissions to have secure communication channels as recommended by the Comelec Advisory Council.

• Allow teachers serving as election inspectors and canvassers to change the individual identification codes that Comelec initially assigns to them. This is like keying in a personal identification number after the bank generates a temporary one. Three hundred thousand teachers will be given the codes as digital signatures in transmitting the results. The Philippine National Public Key Infrastructure will issue the codes under agreement among the Comelec, Dept. of Education and Dept. of Information and Communication Technology.

• Prepare and publish a continuity plan in case of system breakdown or disaster. Lack of such plan at present creates a huge gap or disruption in the balloting chain. Various Comelec resolutions only provide contingencies for failure of counting machines and consolidation-canvassing system. But there is none for the transparency server, national canvassing servers and other processing servers. Section 13 of the law states: “The AES shall be so designed to include a continuity plan in case of a systems breakdown or any such eventuality which shall result in the delay, obstruction or non-performance of the electoral process.”

NetJC trustee Atty. Ronaldo Reyes and TNWI trustees Arnel Victor Valeña and Marlon Anthony Tonson sent the six proposals last Oct. 1. Addressees: Comelec chairman Sheriff Abas and commissioners Rowena Guanzon, Socorro Inting, Marlon Casquejo, Antonio Kho Jr. and Aimee Ferolino.

Invited by Senator Risa Hontiveros to the Comelec’s 2022 budget hearing, they held initial discussions on Oct. 19.

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