Unreasonable and oppressive

In the exercise of police power by the local government, there must be (1) lawful subject such as public welfare or public interest, and (2) lawful method or the reasonableness of the means employed. This case of Lucena City is an example.

With the aim of easing and regulating the traffic flow of buses, mini buses and out of town jeepneys pinpointed as the cause of worsening traffic condition in the City, the Lucena City Sangguniang Panglunsod passed an ordinance (No.1778) prohibiting all such vehicles from entering the city, declaring inoperable all their temporary terminals within the city and requiring that no other terminals shall be situated inside or within the City. The said ordinance likewise directed the said public utility vehicles to utilize the facilities of the Lucena Grand Central Terminal (LGCT) located outside the city which is the permanent common terminal given the exclusive franchise by the Sanggunian under another ordinance (No.1631).

One of those affected by the ordinance was JLI which maintained a terminal within the city. So JLI filed a petition for prohibition and injunction against the City, the Mayor and the Sanggunian claiming among others that said ordinances constituted an invalid exercise of police power. Was JLI correct?

Yes. Like the State, the local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require interference, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

In this case, the questioned ordinances were enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion within the City of Lucena which is to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare and convenience therefore lies at the bottom of the said ordinance warranting the interference of the local government. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present.

But in compelling the common carriers plying routes to and from the city to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities of LGCT, the subject ordinances is characterized by overbreadth and is therefore unconstitutional. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. The purpose to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by absolute prohibition. The proscription against the existence of all terminals apart from that franchised to LGCT cannot be considered reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Bus terminals do not per se impede or help impede the flow of traffic. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals then reasonable specifications for the size of the terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied to those unable to meet the specifications. In subject ordinances, the scope of the proscription is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by LGCT would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive (Lucena Grand Central Terminal Inc. vs. JAC Liner Inc. G.R. 148339, February 23, 2005. 452 SCRA 174)

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