The illusion of peace through appeasing China
The Philippine public discourse on Philippine-China relations is again filled with a resurgence of dangerous arguments that warrant careful scrutiny, and which were recently reinforced by no less than China’s Ambassador to Manila. The recycled claim is that Manila’s supposedly “aggressive” stance against China has “backfired”; that the Philippines should tone down the West Philippine Sea issue because economic engagement matters more than maritime resistance; and that China can help the Philippines weather the global oil crisis and other international issues for that matter if cooperation is prioritized over maritime dispute.
The Filipino public must recognize these arguments for what they truly are – blackmail disguised as goodwill, and acquiescence framed in the language of benevolence. The message from these arguments is clear: the Philippines-China relationship is not one between sovereign equals, and sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction are negotiable commodities exchangeable for some paltry sums of aid and temporary economic comfort.
The failures of the past Philippine approaches have never been excessive assertiveness. It has been the opposite: a long lingering disease of meekness, hesitation, operational caution and self-limitation justified as prudence. For too long, parts of the national security establishment treated naval deployment as provocation, alliance coordination as aggravation, and exercising rights as escalation. Previous policy approaches in Manila treated access to the resources of the West Philippine Sea not as rights but as privileges calibrated according to China’s comfort.
Understanding the lessons of the past
Under the Ferdinand E. Marcos Sr. administration, regardless of how one views his domestic rule, there was at least a more strategic maritime instinct: sovereignty required permanent presence, which necessitates occupation before legal assertion could be transformed into effective control. The Armed Forces of the Philippines occupied strategic areas before the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 1596 that declared the Kalayaan Island Group part of Philippine territory and described the area as vital to national security and economic survival.
Unfortunately, this strategic instinct weakened in the succeeding decades when Manila was overwhelmed with internal security and other domestic demands. Naval and air force modernization was neglected, while national attention and resources were redirected toward domestic insurgencies and other urgent internal concerns.
China saw this vacuum as a strategic opportunity. In 1994, China began its occupation of Panganiban (Mischief Reef), a coercive engagement where Manila relied on protests and dialogue rather than sustained physical presence to counter China’s advance. Eventually, the Philippines lost control of the reef not because it was defeated militarily, but because Manila failed to maintain presence when it mattered most. This lesson of history became even more pronounced in 2012 during the Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) standoff. The Philippines initially responded through naval enforcement. It later scaled back its presence by relying on coast guard ships , believing that this will open avenues for peaceful dialogue and de-escalation. Manila later withdrew altogether after a supposed mutual disengagement arrangement that China never honored.
The reality the Filipino public must understand is that in China’s mindset, absence is surrender, and silence is read as acquiescence. Every time the Philippines steps back to “deescalate”, China steps forward to take the space left behind. Purely rhetorical approaches unsupported by permanent presence, resilient capacity, and international support are viewed as a form of dignified capitulation. In highly contested maritime spaces like the West Philippine Sea, Beijing respects persistence, operational leverage, and national resolve.
The Mythology of Chinese benevolence
The proponents of accommodation often invoke examples of Chinese benevolence. The most common narratives are those of vaccines, tourists, promised investments, and aid in time of dire need. These claims should not be accepted uncritically and should be measured against China’s actual behavior.
The vaccine narrative collapses under China’s own contradictions. The public should remember that Sinovac procurement became controversial because of questions overpricing, transparency, and public accountability. Likewise, while the first Sinovac doses arrived on February 28, 2021, China escalated its actions in the West Philippine Sea such that, by March 2021, about 220 Chinese vessels were reported to have swarmed at Julian Felipe (Whitsun) Reef. As China demonstrated that it could provide vaccines and pressure the Philippines at sea at the same time, the aid was never intended as a genuine gesture of friendship but rather of coercive leverage.
The tourism myth is just as overstated and strategically misleading. While Chinese tourism is arguably important enough to justify market development, it is insufficient to justify supporting a “false tourism value” narrative that implies the Philippines must mute its strategic or legal positions to protect the economy. The national economy was never dependent on this market at a scale that would warrant strategic accommodation and acquiescence. Beijing has previously restricted chartered tours and discouraged outbound travel to the Philippines during periods of tension. Yet, the country adjusted, diversified, and even grew.
Conclusion
The lesson is clear: economic cooperation does not restrain Chinese coercion. Energy would be no different. If anything, energy dependence would give Beijing a more dangerous lever: the ability to influence the Philippine decisions by threatening supply, delaying projects, or attaching political conditions.
The Philippines should engage China where cooperation is lawful, transparent, and reciprocal. But it should reject the illusion that China can be the answer to Manila’s problems because what China is offering is not resiliency, but deeper insecurity.
This is also where Beijing must be judged by its own responsible-power narrative. A responsible power does not weaponize economic relief in exchange for a neighbor’s sovereignty and sovereign rights at sea. If China wants to be regarded as a responsible power in the Indo-Pacific, it should welcome and support a Philippines that is prosperous, independent, and confident in its relationship with the rest of the global community.
Keeping the door open to cooperation should mean a partnership between sovereign equals. The foundation of bilateral stability should not be based on concessions extracted through coercion. It also should not rest on economic comfort that requires Manila to step back from its own waters, own people, and own future. This is the standard of a responsible China should meet and the same one the Philippines and regional governments must collectively uphold.
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Jesse M. Pascasio is a trustee of the Foundation for the National Interest and formerly worked with the Philippines’ Office of the President on strategic maritime concerns.
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