The day FM pulled off martial law

(The following are excerpts from former Senate president Jovito Salonga’s forthcoming book “The Life and Times of Gerry Roxas and Ninoy Aquino,” which chronicles the story of two key figures in the resistance against the Marcos dictatorship and their struggles during the darkest days of martial law.)

MANILA, Philippines - In the early morning of Sept. 23, 1972, I was awakened by a knock on the bedroom door. It was our help. She said that Mrs. Judy Roxas was on the phone, which I thought was a little strange at that hour. She hadn’t done that before. In any case, Judy said that Ninoy Aquino, Pepe Diokno, and Soc Rodrigo had just been arrested and that Gerry (her husband) had gone to Camp Crame to see what could be done to help. She said that martial law had just been imposed.

After her call, I thought to myself: “All the three are my friends, and Ninoy is also my client, one I call my bunso (youngest brother); would I be next?” I must confess I was afraid, not so much at the prospect of being imprisoned – I had been imprisoned by the Japanese before, under incomparably cruel conditions – but at the idea of being virtually helpless due to the many injuries sustained as a result of the Plaza Miranda bombing of Aug. 21, 1971, should I be sent to prison.

I then thought of calling up Letty Shahani, my comadre and the younger sister of General Fidel V. Ramos, the PC Chief. It must have been around one or two in the morning. I asked Letty if martial law had been declared and if I was wanted by the military. She sounded as if she did not know about the first, but she said she would verify the second. After around 20 minutes, she called back. “Yes,” her brother Eddie had said, “martial law has been declared but you are not on the list.” I was thankful but also ashamed that I was unduly worried, probably too wrapped up in myself.

The papers didn’t come that morning. TV and radio stations suddenly stopped broadcasting.

Cory’s arrival and the habeas corpus petition

After breakfast, I phoned my law partners, telling them about the imposition of martial law and inviting them to come to the house. Sed Ordoñez and Pete Yap arrived not too long after my call. While we were discussing the legal implications of the declaration of martial law, Cory came. She was in tears. She said Ninoy had been arrested at the Hilton Hotel by a certain Col. Romy Gatan and his men, presumably on the night of Sept. 22, during a Bicameral Committee meeting on the budget. Apparently, Ninoy had been taken to Camp Crame. She wanted to find out what could be done for Ninoy.

We told her we could file a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court, but given the constraints of martial rule, we couldn’t assure Cory we would succeed. We said we would try though. As soon as she left, we drafted the petition not only for Ninoy Aquino but also for the others who had been arrested and detained, such as Pepe Diokno, Monching Mitra, Soc Rodrigo, Convention delegates Napoleon Rama and Jose Mari Velez, and media publishers and journalists such as Chino Roces, Teddy Locsin, and Max Soliven. We had it filed immediately with the Supreme Court.

The three of us had no doubt that martial law was a watershed, a turning point in the history of the Philippines. When and how it would end was something we could not predict.

In any case, all three of them – Ver, Enrile, and Ramos – were among the principal officers who comprised the “Rolex 12,” so named because Marcos gave each of them a Rolex watch. All the 12 helped Marcos plan martial law in advance. But, in fairness to Enrile and Ramos, at a crucial hour, they mounted a military mutiny against Marcos almost 14 years later (Feb. 22, 1986) which led to the EDSA “people power” revolution that ousted the Marcoses from power on Feb. 25, 1986.

Marcos’s justification for martial law

Having pulled off martial law and jailed his rivals, key opponents, and critics without visible opposition – to the pleasant surprise of his military subordinates and his civilian cronies – Marcos publicly announced the proclamation of martial law on the evening of Sept. 23, 1972, through the facilities of a TV-radio station controlled by Roberto Benedicto, one of his closest associates. Repeatedly, Marcos said: “The proclamation of martial law is not a military takeover.” It had to be done, he said, “to protect the Philippines and our democracy… I repeat, this is not a military takeover… The Government of the Republic of the Philippines which was established by our people in 1946 continues. Again, I repeat: This is the same Government that you and the people established in 1946 under the Constitution of the Philippines. I have had to use this constitutional power in order that we may not completely lose the freedom which we cherish. I assure you this is not a precipitate decision – that I have weighed all the factors.” I thought that his repeated assurance that martial law was not a military takeover, given Marcos’s military background, was a clear case of protesting too much.

In any case, according to Marcos, there were two principal reasons for the imposition of martial law – the Muslim insurgency in the south and the NPA rebellion in the north. He had no other recourse left, in order “to save the Republic and reform society.” The old society was sick, and a “new society” had to be built. Independent observers immediately saw the flaw in Marcos’s announcement – he was the foremost exponent and beneficiary of the “old society.” How and by what moral authority could he be the architect of the “new society”? As for the outbreak of violence in the South, the organization of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was the immediate offshoot of the military operation that Marcos had secretly authorized in 1967-68, resulting in the massacre of Muslim trainees in Corregidor. Like the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the New People’s Army (NPA) was nonexistent when Marcos came to power after his victory in the November 1965 elections. But his record of brazen corruption and repressiveness, as well as the fraudulent and violent elections of 1967 and 1969, encourages the formation and growth of the NPA, enabling it to draw support from the youth in the various schools and colleges in Manila and other urban centers.

The LP meeting in Gerry Roxas’s residence

The following day, I attended a meeting of Party officials called by Gerry Roxas at his residence. The meeting was going on when I arrived. I noticed that those who had been saying that they would oppose martial law – “over my dead body,” as in the case of Mayor Ramon Bagatsing of Manila – were no longer sure what they would do now. There were others who had been known as “Marcos Liberals,” mostly from the North, who were unusually quiet; now we didn’t really know where they stood. Poor Gerry, I thought, he was presiding over a party that was as disunited as ever, with only a handful who could really be trusted.

I had a very private conversation with Gerry after that meeting. He told me about his visit with Ninoy in prison. Ninoy, angry and resentful, shouted at him. Apparently, Ninoy felt that Gerry, as a friend and as head of the Liberal Party, had not done enough for him and the others in the Opposition now behind bars. Gerry, obviously sore, said he kept quiet because there were other people present, nakakahiya naman (it would be shameful), but if Ninoy should shout at him again, he would give it back to Ninoy. I advised Gerry, whose reaction was understandable, to keep his cool. “The time may come,” I said, “when we may join the underground.” He kept quiet.

Immediate effects of martial law

Ironically, in less than one day, the republic President Marcos wanted to save promptly disappeared. General Order No. 1 declared: “I, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, do hereby assume all powers of Government and place all agencies and instrumentalities of the Government under my direction and control.” Other orders and decrees made sure that one-man rule was quickly installed, with the active support of the military. The mass media, the daily newspapers, and radio-TV stations, except those identified with Benedicto, were seized. Curfew was imposed and mass action was prohibited. Workers lost the right to strike and picket. The legislative building was padlocked and no sessions could be held by both houses of Congress. The independence of the judiciary vanished, both under the sweeping language of GO 1 and the more specific ban under GO 3, which removed from the jurisdiction of the courts all cases involving the validity of the proclamation of martial law or any order or decree issued pursuant to said proclamation. Marcos required all judges below the level of Supreme Court justices to submit undated resignations, which he could accept any time. He ordered the disbandment of private armies and the surrender of unlicensed firearms, a move which made martial law more palatable to many people. There seemed to be little awareness of the fact that most of the private armies were those of his political lieutenants and that they had been used to benefit Marcos himself in the 1969 elections. In any case, he could have disbanded them without imposing martial law on the whole population.

I noticed that, after the announcement of martial law, the bombings in the Greater Manila area suddenly stopped. Peace and order promptly descended upon Manila and its environs, to the satisfaction of the citizenry. There were no people in the streets at night because of the curfew. Mothers and housewives obviously welcomed martial rule. In a matter of a few days, the streets were cleaner, and scores of young men made to do some kind of community service. Such slogans as “Martial law, Philippine style” and “Sa ikauunlad ng bayan, disiplina ang kailangan” were popularized through the media. It was clear to me that even if there was no public rejoicing, there was no public resistance to martial law, either. Except for a few who chose not to speak openly, there was a mood of acquiescence among many people I knew. No tears were shed when Congress was abolished, observed UP President Salvador P. Lopez in a lecture he delivered around that time at the East-West Center in Hawaii.

Why Marcos imposed martial law

To the handful in the democratic Opposition who, from the beginning, refused to compromise with the dictator by opposing martial law despite the risks, there was only one simple explanation for its imposition – the desire of Marcos to remain in power beyond 1973. It did not occur to many of us at the time – indeed, we did not know – that he and his wife had already accumulated a substantial amount of hidden wealth in Switzerland when martial law was imposed. On the basis of the documentary evidence that fell into my possession as PCGG chairman immediately after the hurried flight of the Marcoses from Malacañang on Feb. 25, 1986, the last of the EDSA Revolution, the two had begun hiding their immense wealth under pseudonyms and code names in Swiss banks since March 1968 – a little more than two years after becoming president. Obviously, from the viewpoint of Marcos, the imposition of martial law would render it almost impossible for the Opposition to know about the existence of their ill-gotten wealth.

On Oct. 3, 1972, NBC interviewed Marcos in Manila on its “Meet the Press” program from its studio in New York. The satellite interview was broadcast throughout the Philippines and beamed to the United States. I listened in rapt attention and noticed that one newsman, Carl Rowan, placed Marcos on the defensive by asking what I thought were sharp, incisive questions:

Rowan: President Marcos, we get reports out of Manila that you may keep martial law in effect for two years. How long do you anticipate keeping these extraordinary powers?

Marcos: It is my hope that I will be able to lift martial law within my term as President, that is, before the end of 1973. However, I cannot guarantee this. Probably, the Communists can answer this question though.

Rowan: Mr. President, under the present Constitution you are not able to succeed yourself as President. Will you state categorically that you will relinquish power at the end of your term?

Marcos: It is my intention to do so and so state categorically.

The more I thought about what had happened to the country, the more I was convinced about the enormity of the wrong committed by Marcos and his collaborators in the Armed Forces.

Because I knew Marcos, his repeated insistence when he announced the proclamation of martial law that there was no military takeover, that the same government continued to function and that martial law would be used to “protect the Republic and our democracy,” was, to me, an act of deception. In any case, he could not pull off martial law all by himself. He needed the active support of the generals and the high officers of the Armed Forces – and he got it. He needed the full collaboration of his Cabinet and his technocrats, who would be his deodorant – and he got it, too. He needed the entire bureaucracy – he merely frightened them by talking about the reorganization of the government. He needed the Constitutional Convention – so he terrorized and intimidated them by detaining a few outspoken, independent-minded delegates, and that was to prove more than enough. He needed the Supreme Court – he had appointed enough justices who would probably rationalize whatever he wanted, but just to make sure, he crippled them under GO 3 and GO 3-A. He needed the business community – that was no problem as long as there was peace and order. Many businessmen, Filipinos and aliens, actually welcomed martial law for this reason – peace and order would mean sure profits to them, in contrast to the losses they sustained during the demonstrations and riots of 1970. Significantly, among the first to congratulate Marcos for declaring martial law was the US Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines, which sent him a telegram with a pledge of cooperation. The other business groups, local and foreign, followed suit. He needed the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department – apparently, he had assiduously cultivated their support since he came to power on Dec. 30, 1965. Their principal objective: the enhancement of US power and security. As for public opinion, his captive media would take care of that, too.

For its part, the World Bank noted with approval “the proclamation of martial law and the abolition of Congress” as these measures “provided the government with almost absolute power in the field of economic development.” More importantly, the US Embassy was silent about the declaration of martial law and there was nothing in the news dispatches from Washington indicating even a hint of disapproval. Evidently, Marcos’s assurances to the Americans that their military bases in the Philippines, Subic and Clark Field – the biggest US overseas bases in the world – would be safe with him in power paid off. Since the 1971 elections, Marcos had also appointed to his Cabinet US-trained technocrats with whom American business interests were comfortable.

In a well-aimed blow at the Lopez family and the Meralco of which the Lopezes were the managers and controlling shareholders, Marcos slashed electric power rates beginning October 1972. He described them as exorbitant, to the delight of the consuming public. Unknown to many people, a month later Marcos ordered the arrest and detention of Eugenio “Geny” Lopez, Jr., for alleged complicity in the plot to assassinate the president – a charge that sounded rather unusual and fishy to those who, like me, knew this young business executive who had little interest, if any, in partisan politics.

In the meantime, Benedicto’s Daily Express and radio-television stations announced from day to day the glorious achievements of Marcos: the weeding out of crooked cops and corrupt judges, the suspension or reduction of taxes, the purging of undesirable officials and employees, the punishment of extravagance and display of wealth, the curbing of corruption, the imposition of heavier penalty on public officials who receive gifts in their official capacity, the rounding up of notorious characters, the attraction of foreign investments, and the arrest of plotters against the government. It was as if the crusade for good, efficient and honest government began only when martial law was imposed.