Leap of faith

Between the killing of a transgender and “Oplan Stop Nognog 2016,” and with corruption scandals, traffic woes and “fear-bola” tossed in, public attention is fully engaged these days.

There’s barely room in the national consciousness for ongoing deliberations on the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), except among those directly involved in the peace process.

Some of those involved have expressed concern that with the lack of public interest in participating in the deliberations, the BBL will be enacted, only to have its implementation stuck in judicial limbo when its provisions are scrutinized and challenged before the Supreme Court.

A judicial challenge can ruin the projected timetable in the creation of the Bangsamoro  entity under the watch of President Aquino (unless, of course, his dream of enjoying another six years in power comes true).

The signing of the framework agreement and the peace deal with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) generated public excitement for perhaps a day or two for each event, before national attention moved to other issues.

Those involved in the process are aware of the doubts and skepticism over the prospects of success of a peace deal forged with a group that broke away from the one that signed the original peace treaty in 1996.

How is this new deal with the MILF different?

*      *      *

There are at least two differences that I can see. One is decommissioning, which will start within the year and will proceed on a staggered basis.

Former President Fidel Ramos, whose administration signed the original peace treaty with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) headed by Nur Misuari, has clarified to me that the first deal also included turning over weapons. But it looked more like an attempt to make an accounting of the weapons in MNLF possession rather than a surrender (a taboo word in a peace process) of guns.

In the case of the MILF, the group has committed to have no more armed component by 2016, according to those involved in the process. You can pick whatever euphemism you like, but this is understood to mean laying down of arms.

Whether it will actually happen remains to be seen.

A second difference is the creation of a so-called Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission, to be headed by Mo Bleeker, special envoy of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.

The commission has an ambitious mandate: “to address legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people, correct historical injustices, and address human rights violations and marginalization through land dispossession, towards healing and reconciliation.”

Transitional justice is complicated and can sometimes hinder reconciliation in a conflict-torn land. Among the efforts that have had some success is the one in post-apartheid South Africa, but the circumstances are obviously different.

After the collapse of the Marcos dictatorship, Corazon Aquino was criticized for refusing to promote national healing. She never changed her position that there should be justice first before reconciliation.

Unfortunately for the nation, because of the weakness of our criminal justice system, we ended up with neither justice nor reconciliation. Twenty-six years after the people power revolt, we have seized billions of pesos in ill-gotten wealth and approved restitution for human rights victims of the dictatorship, but no one has been punished for amassing the wealth illegally or violating human rights. Is this justice?

Transitional justice has been tricky for several Latin American countries that emerged from dictatorial regimes. In Cambodia, justice for genocide victims took several decades.

In Northern Ireland, the parties involved have focused on only a handful of violent attacks – incidents wherein, as the Brits and Irish like to say, even the dogs on the street knew who was responsible.

The UK has been one of the biggest boosters of the peace process with the MILF. Since 2012 London has assigned Tom Phipps as second secretary for security at the UK embassy here and as representative to the peace talks as part of the International Contract Group.

Phipps denies skeptical comments that the UK is in it for economic opportunities once the Bangsamoro is created. He wished, he said, that UK investors would in fact show more interest in putting their money in the proposed Bangsamoro region. But so far the Brits – like most other foreign investors – are holding back and waiting for peace to actually happen.

Phipps is in a position to say that he thinks there is another difference between the original peace treaty and the new deal: MILF leaders are not like Misuari.

The outsize ego of the MNLF’s founding chairman has been a major stumbling block in the implementation of the original treaty, as far as the negotiators in the second deal are concerned.

*      *      *

Foreign supporters of the new peace process seem more bullish about it than the average Filipino. The foreigners point out that the process has been a big factor in changing perceptions of the Philippines overseas.

Those perceptions have been stuck in images of Imelda Marcos and her shoes, and persistent armed conflict in Mindanao. I’m not sure the perceptions are entirely off-mark: Imeldific is still very much around, with her vast wealth and her clan’s political clout intact – an enduring testament to our failure to achieve transitional justice.

And armed conflict continues in Mindanao, perpetrated by groups beyond the control of the MILF leadership. Today eyes are focused on the Abu Sayyaf, which has threatened to behead two German captives at exactly 3 p.m. unless a P250-million ransom is paid and Berlin commits to stop supporting the campaign against the Islamic State.

Can the new peace deal neutralize the Abu Sayyaf? The answer to that is adding to the skepticism over the peace process. Still, that’s what the process is all about: it’s a leap of faith, and a commitment to give it a chance.