The elephant in the room

Surrender is an ugly word, especially for macho men engaged in armed rebellion. How to describe the laying down of firearms was always a delicate issue between government peace negotiators and the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

The two sides came up with “decommissioning” – the word used in the Northern Ireland peace process – before settling on “normalization.”

STAR editors were told that normalization was going to be part of an annex to the framework peace agreement. Normalization, we were told, would make the deal different from the peace treaty signed in 1996 by the Ramos administration with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) from which the MILF broke away.

This was met with skepticism by those who believe that in the conflict zones of Mindanao, nothing comes between a Muslim man and his gun. To these skeptics, it was not surprising that the peace deal with the MILF was signed and President Aquino submitted the draft Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) to Congress with no mention of normalization, or decommissioning, or disarmament.

Government negotiators said there was no need to include decommissioning in the draft law. The process would simply be carried out by executive action, the public was told by the government panel. But so far we haven’t heard MILF leaders commit to laying down their weapons.

There’s still a long way to go before the Bangsamoro entity can be created. Once enacted, the BBL must be presented to the people for ratification in a plebiscite.

Instead of being handed governance of the Bangsamoro on a silver platter, MILF members must learn to become politicians and campaign for seats in the proposed Bangsamoro parliament, where members will pick the chief executive of the new entity.

This makes sense in our democratic system, but what happens if MILF leaders lose in the elections? They won’t be running unopposed. If no credible challengers run, it will make the supposedly free elections look, well, like a mere moro-moro.

If the Bangsamoro fails to materialize, or if MILF candidates fail to win seats in the proposed parliament, how do you deal with an armed group that finds itself marginalized?

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Any armed group has the potential for violence and abusive behavior. We saw this in Nur Misuari’s MNLF, which was not required to lay down its weapons after the 1996 peace deal. We see this even in cops who become involved in organized crime, or who shake down suspected drug dealers and carjackers and then let the thugs go.

During the first Aquino presidency when Misuari was allowed to surface without fear of arrest, to pave the way for the peace negotiations with his group, I went to the hotel in Mindanao where he and his wives were billeted. The hotel crawled with MNLF fighters, all of them heavily armed and in uniform bearing MNLF patches.

The sight of such firepower at the hands of a large group that has no authority to bear arms does not invite confidence that peace is dawning.

That band of MNLF fighters looked and behaved like the private army of one man. And that was exactly how a number of them behaved in the years when Misuari tried his hand at governance, as head of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

Not content with his private army, Misuari used ARMM funds to build up an arsenal that he tapped in staging a so-called mini rebellion from Zamboanga to Sulu, when it looked certain that he would lose his grip on power in the autonomous region.

The government has downplayed Misuari’s complaints about the implementation of the original peace treaty and has treated him like a nuisance spoiler. But this spoiler is far more dangerous than nuisance candidate Ely Pamatong; Misuari refuses to be swatted away like a fly.

That “invasion” of Sabah, which strained Philippine relations with Malaysia, was carried out mostly by MNLF men identified with Misuari. They were also behind the three-week siege of Zamboanga last year, from which the city has yet to recover.

In addition to Misuari’s MNLF faction, peace in Mindanao is threatened by the MILF’s own breakaway group called the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, the extremist Abu Sayyaf and its allies in the terrorist cell Jemaah Islamiyah, and long-running violent feuds among clans and tribes.

If MILF members are elected to govern the Bangsamoro entity, they will have to deal with these threat groups. These are not the types who like discussing issues; they prefer settling arguments through the barrel of a gun.

Ideally, it’s the national government that should neutralize these threats. But the Philippine National Police and its mother agency, the Department of the Interior and Local Government, can’t even deal with rising criminality in Metro Manila. PNP members themselves are involved in crime.

With these in mind, the reluctance of the MILF to lay down arms is understandable. As part of confidence-building measures, however, the MILF leadership will have to give clear indications soon that decommissioning will happen in the foreseeable future.

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It’s always good for peace when a group is persuaded to give up its armed struggle for whatever cause it espouses.

A peace agreement with an insurgent group provides breathing space for the government to bring development to conflict zones.

The international community likes peace agreements. Never mind if there is a peace treaty in place, with the MNLF – foreign development aid is expected to pour into the Bangsamoro entity if it is created as planned.

It will be good if official development assistance for the Bangsamoro would be backed by significant levels of foreign direct investment that can create jobs for people in the affected areas.

But money is a scaredy commodity, and as it is, investors have enough problems dealing with our country’s business-unfriendly environment. Threats to personal safety in the conflict zones of Mindanao, where MILF members have been previously implicated in kidnappings, assassinations and banditry, can only aggravate the problems.

Those who want to participate in the development of the areas that may be included in the Bangsamoro will feel more secure without armed groups posing threats to their projects and enterprises.

The MILF can boost peace prospects by committing that it will soon cease to be an armed group.