Reforming the AFP

When several former chiefs of staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines faced the House of Representatives last week to deny receiving pabaon, pasalubong and monthly payoffs, ugly speculation focused on several of those who were not there.

Most sorely missed were retired Generals Diomedio Villanueva and Roy Cimatu, who have been accused of receiving P10 million each in welcome money upon assuming the top AFP post.

Cimatu, still a special envoy to the Middle East, has reportedly opted to bury his head in the sands of Egypt, where surely the Philippine embassy is ably attending to the needs of Filipinos who might be affected by ongoing protests against embattled President Hosni Mubarak.

Villanueva cited the death of his wife in begging off from the congressional probes. In a society that can be terribly nasty, the sooner he issues a statement in his defense even while in bereavement, the better for him.

Otherwise he might suffer the fate of former AFP chief Angelo Reyes, who through his initial reactions unwittingly bolstered the accusations hurled against him by retired military budget officer Lt. Col. George Rabusa.

Instead of immediately calling Rabusa a hallucinating liar, and why not, even attempting to publicly strangle the budget officer for the story about a P50-million pabaon (converted into greenbacks), Reyes asked plaintively if he had ever been greedy or demanding.

A week after Rabusa testified about the P10 million (and possibly many millions more for Villanueva, unless retired AFP comptroller Carlos Garcia kept the money for himself), we still have to hear categorical denials from Villanueva and Cimatu.

The former AFP chiefs who appeared at the House hearing may be disappointed to find out that there are people who are skeptical about their denials. Incumbent military officers acknowledge the need to work on public perceptions that massive corruption persists in their organization.

Equally important is the need to reassure foot soldiers that when they lack ammunition or food or durable boots, it is not because their generals are pocketing millions of pesos in AFP funds.

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Reforms in the AFP were implemented after the 2003 Oakwood mutiny, when the Feliciano Commission recommended detailed measures to discourage coup attempts and corruption in the military. Lawmakers conducting the probes into AFP corruption might want to take note of the reforms.

I have written that retired Gen. Narciso Abaya, who was among the five former AFP chiefs who appeared at the House hearing, introduced the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System that brought fund discretion down from AFP General Headquarters to field commanders. Abaya was AFP chief from 2003 to 2004 when the Garcia scandal broke.

Several key reforms were introduced by Abaya’s successor Gen. Efren Abu, who served as AFP chief from October 2004 to August 2005. Abu, who took over the AFP at the height of the Garcia scandal, has not appeared in Congress.

As AFP chief, Abu abolished J-6, or the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Comptrollership, breaking down its functions into four offices that could countercheck each other’s fund utilization and other activities.

Over the weekend, Abu informed me that among the reforms introduced was the “devolvement and return” of billions of pesos that used to be centrally managed by the Office of the Chief of Staff to the major service commands – the Army, Navy and Air Force. The major services also took over payment of salaries of their respective personnel, leaving to GHQ only the salaries of technical and civilian AFP employees.

Management of funds for the paramilitary units or CAFGU was also transferred by Abu from GHQ to the Philippine Army.

Abu also abolished the Logistics Command and transferred its powers and functions to the major services “in order to preclude any chance of corruption in central procurement.”

As the logistics system underwent a major overhaul, each unit or office was required to prepare an Annual Procurement Plan, which served as the basis for fund requests including cash advances. This system was used to deter the fund “conversion” that Rabusa revealed.

Abu asked the Department of National Defense to post Special Disbursing Officers in all offices without one, with first lieutenants instead of only captains being named as SDOs.

He also activated the AFP Counter-Intelligence Group to assist the Office of the Internal Auditor and the Office of Ethical Standards and Public Accountability in monitoring violations of rules, regulations, orders and policies.

“The rationale behind this was to ensure that reform policies actually took root and would not be subverted in the implementation process,” Abu told me.

Like several other military officers (active and retired), Abu said he saw “in a positive light” the current focus on corruption in the AFP.

He said it provides a chance to “help cleanse the system, sustain the momentum of reforms and bring back the prestige and respect of the AFP as a professional institution in service of the people.”

AFP and defense officials have told me that the reforms remain in place. Their biggest hurdle is public skepticism.

“The AFP is not a perfect institution, it will never be,” Abu told me, “but it will continue to grow and improve.”