Securing the frontline: A blueprint for the future of Philippines-US defense
This year, the Philippines and the United States mark a double milestone—80 years of diplomatic ties and the 75th anniversary of the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)—coinciding with Manila assuming the chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Far from just a historical commemoration, this milestone has been met with a shift. Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., Manila has enacted the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept, shifting the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from internal security toward an outward-facing, forward-defense posture. This has refocused the US partnership on securing the country’s maritime zones.
But Beijing’s maneuvers in the West Philippine Sea continue unabated, stopping below the threshold of an armed attack to avoid triggering US defense commitments. This coercion risks rendering the alliance irrelevant. Furthermore, because a contingency over Taiwan would concern the Philippines, Manila has incentives to contribute to regional deterrence and, should it fail, a US-led response. The challenge is to counter sub-threshold threats while building defense capabilities, safeguarding Manila’s maritime domain without ceding its autonomy.
To do so, the Philippines and the United States should take six steps.
First, they should build an integrated air and missile defense shield. The primary tactical vulnerability of the AFP is the lack of layered air defenses to protect its territory, leaving Northern Luzon exposed to potential spillover or strikes in a conflict over Taiwan.
As the alliance utilizes cutting-edge hardware during field training, the focus should pivot toward protection. Manila should match US foreign military financing with its own revitalized Self-Reliant Defense Posture program. The alliance should focus on technology transfers and co-production that integrate permanent radar tracking and interceptor networks into the AFP’s “kill web” architecture, securing skies while building a self-sustaining defense capability that underpins the country’s autonomy.
Second, the alliance should institutionalize routine joint coast guard patrols. The flashpoint of modern maritime coercion is not the gray hull of a traditional navy, but the white hull of a coast guard vessel or a maritime militia. Now that Manila and Washington have reaffirmed that the MDT covers an armed attack on either country’s Coast Guard vessels anywhere in the South China Sea, the next step is operationalizing deterrence against coercion below the military threshold. Transitioning from occasional drills to permanent, synchronized surface presence combining the Philippine and US coast guards will establish a united front against unlawful gray-zone blockades.
Third, the alliance should harden cyber networks and sites under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). The alliance should fast-track US technical support to harden the Philippine military’s command-and-control architecture against state-sponsored cyber warfare. Physically, EDCA sites lack the fortification to withstand a high-intensity theater conflict. Given Northern Luzon’s proximity to a Taiwan flashpoint, these locations should become hardened, resilient nodes.
EDCA locations should prove their value to local host communities as state-of-the-art dual-use logistics hubs equipped for rapid humanitarian assistance and disaster response. By ensuring that these sites serve a civic purpose during typhoons and natural catastrophes, the alliance will build the local trust necessary to harden these networks.
Fourth, the alliance should multilateralize the regional security web. A purely bilateral relationship risks allowing an adversary to isolate Manila or frame its posture as a proxy conflict. The Philippines should use its treaty to anchor minilaterals, operationalizing its Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan and Status of Visiting Forces Agreement with Australia through joint maritime sails and expanded training.
Fifth, the alliance should turn the Luzon Economic Corridor into an economic shield. Expanding the steering committee to include global allies is good, but memorandums should yield brick-and-mortar results. Manila and Washington should accelerate investments in clean energy, digital infrastructure, and semiconductor supply chains from Subic Bay to Batangas. Linking the alliance to local livelihoods will insulate the Philippine economy from external coercion.
Sixth, Manila and Washington should invest in institutional memory and the next generation of alliance leaders. To survive political transitions in both capitals, the alliance should build long-term intellectual infrastructure. Doing so means expanding bilateral civil service fellowships, maritime law pipelines, and technical exchanges like the new US-backed civil nuclear curriculum and training partnerships. Training strategic thinkers and doers ensures a clear-eyed, proactive alliance over the next quarter-century.
After 75 years of the MDT, the alliance should evolve toward peace preservation. A modernized, well-allied Philippines does not invite conflict; it prevents it. As ASEAN chair, Manila can demonstrate that its evolving posture and defense networks enhance autonomy. By driving progress on a South China Sea code of conduct and steering the ASEAN Community Vision 2045, Manila can also show that a strong, secure Philippines is the anchor for regional centrality, preserving national dignity, economic resilience and self-reliance.
--
David Santoro is President and CEO of the Hawaii-based Pacific Forum, which runs the annual Honolulu Defense Forum (HDF), an event that facilitates dialogue between public and private-sector actors to bolster US and allied deterrence in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific.
- Latest
