I recently attended a forum co-organized by the Stratbase Institute and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) Philippines. My topic looked at the “Gaps, Challenges, and Opportunities for Modernizing the Armed Forces.” Instead of a deep dive into the gist of the topic, I decided to go back to when it all started: in the aftermath of the Scarborough Shoal stand-off in 2012.
That incident triggered our legal journey in The Hague that ended with the issuance of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on July 12, 2016. We will be commemorating the 10th anniversary of that successful undertaking this year.
As the Task Force 11 Commander at that time, I believed that the incident required a strategic assessment and a forward-looking approach to address the post-Scarborough shoal standoff scenario. The result of this undertaking was later used in charting the Navy’s capability plan in support of its modernization under Horizon 1 and 2 of the revised modernization plans of the AFP. It also prepared the Navy for China’s employment of the Three Warfares Strategy, which we now call foreign interference and malign influence (FIMI).
Back then, in September 2012, our analysis pointed out that China’s critical vulnerability is its heavy dependence on maritime shipping to sustain its economy. At that time, the data available indicated that 85% of its international trade moved by sea. In 2009, about 50% of its oil was imported from the Middle East, and by 2020, it was forecast that 65% of its oil consumption would be imported.
More compelling were the figures culled from naval intelligence data, which tracked international shipping going to or coming from ports in mainland China passing through the Philippine archipelago. The assessment concluded that the likely decisive point for any conflict with China would be in our archipelagic straits or SLOCs, specifically Mindoro Strait, Sibutu Strait and Basilan Strait.
It was also concluded that our critical vulnerability was our open society. This was considering that the CCP treated liberal democracy as an existential challenge to its regime survival. Hence, a kinetic or physical attack on our home soil was unlikely. More plausible was the subversion of our bureaucracies, the cooptation of our political leadership, or disruptions in society in general.
As Xi Jinping consolidated his power over the CCP, we also saw progress in its maritime power. In 2013, they started the reclamation of their occupied features, which eventually evolved into naval bases. Its five civilian maritime agencies were consolidated to form the Chinese Coast Guard.
The PLA-Navy was experimenting with new classes of warships, which were later churned out by its shipbuilding industrial base into newer variants of destroyers, frigates and cutters. But the more problematic development was the extensive use of militia vessels to support its grayzone operations in the West Philippine Sea.
In 2016, when we sat down to craft the Navy’s capability plan to support its modernization targets under the Revised Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Program (RAFPMP), we focused on two approaches: a denial strategy to address the growing PLA-Navy surface fleet and a cost-imposition strategy to deal with China’s vulnerable merchant fleet that passes through our archipelagic waters. These key points were later used as the basis for the acquisition proposals for the Indian BrahMos anti-ship missile batteries and the French Scorpene diesel-electric submarine.
Moving forward to 2026, transitioning the AFP into a multi-domain force to generate the desired deterrent effect will be a challenging task. To make it work, the foundation needs to be well laid out.
First, we have to have a clear understanding of the nature of the adversary and to be mindful of its strengths and weaknesses in all aspects of national power.
Second is to have a clearer understanding of our own strengths and weaknesses, and to ensure that we can mitigate any attacks against our vulnerabilities.
Third is a clear and coherent strategy that is understood by everyone. A strategy, after all, is not something you keep in a locked safe. Fourth, capabilities should factor in our geographical realities, their cost-effectiveness, and the development of an industrial base to support their sustainability.
Going into specifics, I believe that a realistic modernization of the AFP rests on the following nexus: strategy, human resources, capabilities and organization.
As I have articulated in other forums and in previous writings, we need to synchronize our diplomatic, information, military, and economic approaches. This calls for a more pro-active Commander-in-Chief to provide the overarching direction, and a national security team that prioritizes mission success over parochial interests.
On the military end of the spectrum, the so-called CADC needs to be translated into DND’s National Defense Strategy (NDS) and reflected as part of the AFP’s National Military Strategy (NMS). Each document should consider how interagency collaboration can be incorporated as part of our reserve force development mechanism.
In terms of human resource development, I see the need for an established succession management plan among the senior leadership, as well as better consultations between DND and AFP on the future force structure.
But more important is rediscovering the “warrior ethos” among our senior commanders, which has been stymied in recent years by micro-management at the executive level and the influence of bureaucratic politics.
In terms of capability, there might be a need to take a second look at the Self-Reliant Defense Posture (SRDP) Law, particularly in how public-private sector collaboration can be enhanced, and in how we can have an audit of laws and policies affecting DND and DTI that have a huge impact on the viability of a defense industry in the country.
Lastly, in terms of organization, there should also be only one agency accountable for, and one person directing, the implementation of any strategy in the WPS.
In this case, it should reside in the Department of National Defense and in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The stove-piping in the current set-up has created blind spots and bureaucratic friction, which only benefits China. Our struggle in the WPS is both primordial and existential. We need to act resolutely. In fact, we needed to act yesterday.
I close with a brief recollection from a few days after the Scarborough Shoal stand-off had settled. While at the task force headquarters, I received a short email from a close friend, a Navy officer taking his advanced studies at a military school in Nanjing, China.
To paraphrase, his classmates from the People’s Liberation Army asked him why we gave up so easily on Scarborough Shoal. That question haunts me to this day.
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RADM Rommel Jude Ong is a non-resident fellow at the Stratbase Institute and professor of Praxis at the Ateneo School of Government. He retired in 2019 as vice commander of the Philippine Navy.