Manila buys time, Beijing saves face

CHINA must have known from the very beginning that it would lose the arbitration case in The Hague. Otherwise it would not have stayed away and deprived itself of the chance to sell the world its nine-dash line theory of unilaterally demarcating the waters of the South China Sea.

While Manila is buying time to decide how best to manage its historic victory, Beijing may be looking for a way to save face as a loser on the world stage. President Rodrigo Duterte can help them.

This is Asia, where losing face could be crushing. It is important that Manila, the winner in the arbitration case, give the haughty Mandarins in Beijing time to make adjustments.

Mr. Duterte told his Cabinet in advance that they would not taunt nor flaunt the favorable ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. When the award was handed down last July 12, he left the matter to the experts for them to study before he takes the next steps.

It was his predecessor ex-President Noynoy Aquino who spoke up and issued what sounded like a self-congratulatory statement reminding all and sundry that he was the one who filed the complaint in 2013.

How to enforce the favorable ruling? It would look ludicrous for Mr. Duterte to shoot from the hip a “get out” message to Beijing – or, as he joked during the May election campaign, ride a jetski to a Philippine-claimed Spratly island and plant the flag on it.

A watchful calculated approach may prove more productive in dealing with a neighbor that has more military muscle and much more time at its disposal. Even if the normally tough-talking President wants to be confrontational, he does not have the military bite to back up the bark.

Mr. Duterte has to buy time. While doing so, he should first make sure that the Philippines speaks with just one voice. Only the President or, as authorized, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs is the sole spokesman on the matter.

That cacophony in the Congress, the media, the academe, et cetera, is just the croaking of frogs. Same thing with foreign powers, and their native lobbyists, trying to  catch the ear of the President to advance their own interests.

Requiring immediate attention are the Filipino fishermen long deprived of their traditional livelihood. They should be restrained from setting out for Panatag shoal off Zambales that the previous administration surrendered to the Chinese in 2012.

Their premature venturing out could derail normalization. But they should be given prompt and adequate assistance while they wait.

President Duterte should consider nominating a new ambassador to Beijing. Getting an agrement can take time, which is good as it will afford both countries ample time to sort out things amicably to their mutual satisfaction and benefit.

• Salient points of arbitral ruling summarized

THE PERMANENT Court of Arbitration ruling on the South China Sea question is final and binding upon the Philippines and China. It favors most of the 15 pleadings submitted by Manila.

But the ruling is silent on the ownership of the disputed maritime features (such as rocks or low-tide elevations). It only clarifies the maritime entitlements (territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf) generated by them, but does not resolve their ownership.

Ownership equates to sovereignty (the exercise of the full power and authority of the State), while maritime entitlements equal sovereign rights (the right to exploit and manage natural resources). If the feature is within the Philippines’ 200-nautical mile EEZ, the country has sovereign rights over the exploitation of its resources.

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, China’s claim to so-called historic rights in the maritime areas covered by its “nine-dash line” is invalid. Such historic rights were invalidated with the adoption of UNCLOS, to which China and the Philippines are signatories.

However, the arbitration ruling is silent on the claimed historic rights of China over the features (the land) themselves.

It deems the following to be “high-tide features” (or “rocks”), which generate only a territorial sea (12 nautical miles from the shoreline), but not an EEZ nor a continental shelf: Scarborough Shoal (Bajo de Masinloc or Panatag Shoal), Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Johnson Reef, McKennan Reef, and Gaven Reef.

It considers the following as “low-tide elevations,” which generate neither territorial sea, continental shelf nor EEZ: Hughes Reef, Gaven Reef North, Subi Reef, Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal (Ayungin Shoal, where the decrepit BRP Sierra Madre lies grounded).

The tribunal rules that not one of the high-tide features in the Spratly Islands is capable of sustaining human habitation or an economic life of its own. Therefore, Thitu Island (Pagasa Island which has a Filipino community) and Itu Aba (Taiping Island occupied by Taiwan with soldiers and facilities) are only deemed to be “rocks.” They only generate 12 nautical miles and not an EEZ or a continental shelf.

The ruling is clear that Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are part of the Philippines’ EEZ and continental shelf, since they are not overlapped by entitlements generated by features claimed by China.

On Mischief Reef, China’s construction activities there are deemed unlawful as they were undertaken without the authorization of the Philippines. Mischief Reef cannot be appropriated.

As to Scarborough (Panatag) Shoal, the tribunal rules that it is unlawful for China to prevent Filipinos from fishing there despite its being their traditional fishing ground. This could mean that the Philippines and China may have to share Scarborough’s fisheries.

The arbitral tribunal rules that China’s reclamation activities violated UNCLOS, and adversely affected the marine environment. Further reclamation undertaken while the case was being heard aggravated the dispute.

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