The successful transition of the Philippine Army (PA) towards a territorial defense posture is critical to the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP) emerging archipelagic defense strategy.
The Army’s organization, doctrine and leadership have been shaped by decades of counterinsurgency campaigns focused on internal stability. However, fully restructuring its fighting units could be disruptive and may hinder the PA's capacity to address emerging security challenges, particularly those posed by a coercive and ambitious China.
China is not only targeting the Philippines' core national interests and its sovereign rights in the West Philippine Sea. Its threats also extend to the political sphere, affecting leadership, bureaucracy, elections, public opinion and various institutions.
Recent controversies, including Senate hearings on online gambling, mining in Palawan, and espionage activities linked to Chinese actors, highlight these challenges. The public discourse is further clouded by extensive disinformation campaigns in both social and mainstream media, resulting in a toxic political environment.
In this context, the Army's experience in countering insurgents and terrorists remains pertinent to addressing Chinese influence operations in the Philippines. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views liberal democracy as its ideological enemy.
Interestingly, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the New People's Army (NPA), and the National Democratic Front (NDF) share doctrinal foundations rooted in the ideologies of Lenin, Marx, and Mao. This presents a familiar battleground for the Army. Thus, transitioning to a territorial defense, or more fittingly termed homeland defense, may not be as complex as initially believed.
To equip the Army for territorial defense missions, it may be necessary to challenge the current "force provide-force employer" concept and revert to the administrative structure outlined in the Administrative Code of 1987. The force providers refer to the three major services: the Army, Air Force, and the Navy.
The force employers are the Unified Commands, which are joint organizations that utilize the units of the three services to conduct operations within their jurisdiction. This change would involve deactivating the Unified Commands, enabling the Army, along with the Navy and Air Force, to take back responsibility for major operations nationwide.
In this structure, the Army's Commanding General would oversee ground operations and defense planning for the archipelago, including the protection of vital government institutions and critical infrastructure such as water supply systems, power grids, telecommunications, and transportation hubs. Deactivating the Unified Commands would allow the establishment of an Army Corps, maintaining its role as a joint command while also having authority over Army Divisions and Reserves.
This reconstitution of the Army Corps is crucial to addressing the primary security challenge: identifying provinces, cities, businesses and schools significantly affected by Chinese influence, interference, or espionage.
Special focus should be given to areas near military facilities, transport hubs, and strategic waterways, as well as investigating local purveyors of disinformation promoting pro-China narratives. Collaboration among the Army Intelligence Regiment, Signal Regiment, and Civil-Military Operations Regiment will be vital, not just for counterintelligence work but also for purposeful stakeholder engagement.
The next priority is transitioning regular forces from counterinsurgency operations to combined arms operations that can survive in environments akin to the Ukraine-Russian conflict. Combined arms operations involve the simultaneous or sequential use of infantry, armor, artillery, and aviation elements against a military objective.
The first step in this shift would involve reconfiguring numbered Army Divisions as the principal tactical commands of the Corps, replacing Brigades. These divisions can be organized as Mechanized Infantry, Motorized Infantry, Littoral, or Mountain Divisions, tailored to their equipment and operational terrain.
These formations should interact not only with traditional combat support elements—such as armor, artillery, aviation, engineering, and naval components—but also with modern technologies like drones, cyber capabilities, electronic warfare, and artificial intelligence. To protect the seat of government, the Light Reaction Regiment should be actively involved, ensuring rapid response and operational efficiency.
Lastly, the Army Artillery Regiment (AAR) is responsible for developing the Army's long-range, land-based fire capabilities, which include land-attack and anti-ship missiles. Plans are underway to acquire BrahMos anti-ship missile batteries, although it remains unclear whether this decision was based on a thorough assessment of capability gaps.
In contrast, the Philippine Navy (PN) and Marine Corps justify their missile acquisitions as a response to the dominant presence of the People's Liberation Army Navy in the West Philippine Sea.
Additionally, there is currently no mechanism for the PN's warships to operate alongside the Philippine Army's ground units in the West Philippine Sea. This contrasts with the Fleet-Marine tandem, which enables a collaborative 'kill chain' system between the PN and the Philippine Marine Corps (PMC).
Recent exercises involving the US Typhon missile revealed the need for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to develop a long-range land-attack capability.
However, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) limits access to missiles with ranges over 300 km. The AFP has three options: develop its own missiles, acquire them from non-MTCR states, or set up a joint control protocol over the pre-positioned Typhon batteries.
Meanwhile, the Philippine Air Force (PAF) is focused on ground-based air defense systems for air base protection, but lacks coverage for other key sites and critical infrastructure.
To address these challenges, the Army could: (1) advocate for a joint C4ISTAR infrastructure to unify anti-ship missile capabilities among the PA, PN, PAF, and PMC; (2) engage with the US or Japan for ballistic missile deployment under existing agreements such as the EDCA and RAA; (3) establish protocols for PH-US-Japan joint control and employment with these missile systems; and (4) devise a plan to fill air defense gaps not covered by the PAF.
In summary, the Army should adapt to a new security landscape through reevaluation of its structure, strategy and operational capabilities.
By leveraging its historical experience and shifting its focus towards territorial defense, the Army can effectively counter emerging threats and protect national interests. Its future path entails coordination with the other services and the need for innovation in addressing the complexities of modern security challenges.
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RADM Rommel Jude Ong is a non-resident fellow at the Stratbase Institute and professor of Praxis at the Ateneo School of Government. He retired in 2019 as vice commander of the Philippine Navy.