Postscript on Tommy's losses: Sore campaigns do not pay

Philippine Institute of Applied Politics

When the smoke of political battle cleared, re-election-bound Michael Rama has had 6,376 votes more than Rep. Tomas Osmeña, in a surprising upset painted on odds most people thought were largely on the challenger's favor, analysts say.

The final count showed 217,448 for Rama and 211,072 for Osmeña, as though history repeated itself before Cebu: little David killed Goliath again! What went wrong for Tommy? What turned out right for Rama?

The campaign has had three stages - build-up, consolidation, and momentum - and obviously Tomas Osmeña and his BOPK party should have found themselves deficient and wanting in these aspects.

The Rama campaign plan was simple: it was meant to draw sharp comparison and/or distinction between two protagonists, in various political hues, socio-economic colors, and impact to individuals and organizations. The BOPK, on the other hand, from start to finish, was bent on demolition jobs to discredit Rama, painting him as indecisive, unfocused, lacking in vision, and at a certain point, gay. It was powered by one man's anger and hatred.

Tommy had lost more than half of the formidable coalition of 726 organizations he had built when he first ran for mayor in January 1988. Against Mayor Rama's bottom-to-top structure, which was backstopped by strong allies in former Rep. Antonio Cuenco, former mayor Alvin Garcia, 46 barrio captains, 414 barrio councilmen, and a host of former city councilmen, he has little strength to count on when he began campaigning in May 2012. Suspicions of infiltration and loyalty questions within the ranks repeatedly stalled his organizing pace. The BOPK has been decimated by defections, intrigue, bickering, disunity, and brain drain in the last 24 years.

While Rama was able to organize and empower 64 parallel organizations built around friendships he has forged with city government department heads and CEOs of home-grown companies during the consolidation stage around January 2013, Tommy increasingly relied on 34 allies among barrio captains, 51 newly formed voter fronts and/or alliances with urban-poor sector groups, and money to move volunteers led by untrained, inefficient leaders.

Team Rama had thousands of volunteers who served without pay or allowance. Tommy and his party also had thousands, all hired hands, ready for work because he had money to pay.

By the time Rama acquired momentum during most days of April 2013, the BOPK caught itself on the defensive on many fronts, drawing heavy fire on seven decisive issues - integrity, experience, competence, charisma, health, performance, and platform all directed on Tommy - for which altogether the party eventually failed to respond well. Leaks on the BOPK-commissioned political tracking poll and voter preference survey conducted by students of the University of San Carlos and some of its professors, in which Osmeña and the BOPK were lackluster and faring less than expected, have had created the strong public perception that Rama has finally gained the upper hand.

Twelve days into May 13, during which concluding campaigns by Team Rama zeroed in on Tommy's character, attitude toward people (peers and subordinates), performance as legislator and past mayor, and platform, the BOPK instead viciously counterattacked with negative campaigning, raising the specter of Rama's alleged ties with drug lords, Rama's failed marriage, and Rama's psychiatry record, that boomeranged altogether and hurt Tommy even more.

Despite massive election spending for some last-ditch attempt to wrest the initiative, the endgame turned tables in Rama's favor. Tommy lost 447 votes in Guadalupe, where up to 31,756 of its 32, 411voters turned up to cast their ballots and where he is a registered voter. Worse, in his own precinct, he lost to Rama 27 against one. Rama lost only in 29 of the 80 barrios and 547,681 electors that made up the city's political landscape.