Villanueva blamed for Sayyaf escape

No military-Abu Sayyaf collusion, after all.

No less than Armed Forces chief Gen. Diomedio Villanueva is being blamed for the Lamitan, Basilan debacle where Abu Sayyaf bandits, holding several hostages, managed to escape on June 2 although they had been surrounded by government troops.

According to an internal report of the Armed Forces Inspector General (AFP-IG), Villanueva committed a grave error in judgment and issued a wrong order to ground forces in Lamitan.

But Armed Forces spokesman Brig. Gen. Edilberto Adan said Villanueva should not be faulted for the error because it is within his authority to issue orders as AFP chief.

"Like a President calling someone down the line, it’s within his right. I don’t think the chief of staff should be criticized for that," Adan said in a telephone interview.

Adan explained that Brig. Gen. Romeo Dominguez had already taken responsibility for bringing down the troops to Tuburan town, a critical order that, according to the IG report, was one of the reasons for the fiasco.

"It’s rather unusual but it’s within his (Villanueva’s) right (to issue the order)," Adan added. "As a senior commander, the chief of staff should not be faulted for that."

Adan defended Villanueva even as Malacañang described as "too strong" suggestions that military officers involved in the Lamitan fiasco undergo court-martial proceedings.

"It is too strong unless proven that there was collusion with the Abu Sayyaf, which I think is not true. Tactical errors in operations are not a basis for court martial," said Presidential Spokesman Rigoberto Tiglao.

He said that while Congress has the right to conduct its own investigation in aid of legislation, the proper authority on courts martial is the Armed Forces Inspector General.

And no less than AFP-IG Brig. Gen. Reynaldo Rivera Jr. headed the fact-finding body that found Villanueva committed the error in judgment and issued a wrong order to troops in Basilan.

"The problem with General Villanueva was he interfered with the operations. Had he left the matter to ground forces, things would have gone smoothly," said the nine-page internal report.

Aside from Rivera, the officers who wrote the report were personnel officer Maj. Ramiro Rey, intelligence officer Capt. Expedito Biña, operations officer Capt. Ernesto Cruz, logistics officer Capt. Arthur Tablas and Capt. Rigor Baroquillo of the Army inspector general’s office.

In the nine-page report, the officers said Villanueva had "intention or unintentionally violated" the observance of the proper chain of command by issuing orders directly to battalion commanders pursuing the bandits.

The report noted that Villanueva made several calls to the staff of the 103rd Brigade and to the officers of the 18th Infantry Battalion in Basilan.

The chain of command requires that Villanueva, as Armed Forces chief, should deal with the chief of the AFP Southern Command or with the commander of the Army 1st Infantry Division which has jurisdiction over the area.

Maintaining contact

The most crucial call, the fourth one, was made by Villanueva when he arrived at the 103rd Brigade headquarters in Isabela City in Basilan on June 2 at around 9:10 a.m.

In that call, Villanueva instructed 18th IB commander Maj. Daniel Lucero to "maintain contact" with the bandits whom he and his men encountered in nearby Tuburan town the day before because he believed the June 2 attack on Lamitan at around 2:30 a.m. was just a diversionary tactic.

The order, however, effectively rescinded the directive of 103rd Brigade commander Col. Juvenal Narcise to Lucero — just 10 minutes earlier — to deploy his forces from Tuburan to Lamitan.

It was not clear whether Villanueva knew the Abu Sayyaf bandits encountered by Lucero and his men were actually the same ones who occupied the Jose Ma. Torres Hospital and the St. Peter’s Church in Lamitan.

Villanueva was also apparently unaware that Army troops in Lamitan, led by Capt. Ruben Guinolbay, had already lost one man and sustained eight wounded men after they were ambushed seven hours earlier.

Higher authorities may not have wanted Lucero’s men to leave Tuburan as it already pledged that elements of the AFP Counter Terrorist Force and two companies of Marines were to arrive in Lamitan at around noon of June 2.

Because of Villanueva’s order, Narcise "had no option but to utilize available forces on hand and wait for reinforcements as committed by higher headquarters which was to arrive in two hours."

Unfortunately, the reinforcements arrived at around 9 p.m., or several hours after the Abu Sayyaf managed to escape through the east and south wings of the hospital with their hostages from Palawan and four new hostages from the hospital.

"Had the AFP Counter Terrorist Force arrived within two hours as promised or had the elements of the 18th IB been allowed to proceed to Lamitan, government forces could have fixed and finished the enemy," the report said.

Rivera’s report said Narcise’s order to Lucero to shift his forces from Tuburan to Lamitan was the "better course of action" to take and that they would be backed by reinforcements from the counter-terrorist force and the Marines.

"First, his units were more familiar with the area than that of the AFP Counter Terrorist Force since it was their AOR (area of responsibility)," the report read.

"Secondly, CO, 18th IB (Lucero) stated they could have arrived in Lamitan from Tuburan within two hours, much earlier than the nine hours of the Counter Terrorist Force," it said.

"Thirdly, the enemy forces being pursued at Tuburan was the group that was in Lamitan, hence, was not a diversionary force," the report added.

Apart from the crucial call on June 2, Villanueva called Lucero at around 9 a.m. the day before ordering him to maintain contact or continue pursuing the bandits in Tuburan.

The fighting in Tuburan on June 1 was the first encounter between government forces and the bandits who had abducted 20 people, including three Americans, from the upscale Dos Palmas island resort off Palawan on May 27.

Villanueva also made another call to Lucero around 11:30 a.m., the same day "asking for requirements needed by his unit" in Tuburan.

He also reportedly issued a direct instruction to Army Capt. Hubert Acierto, intelligence and operations officer of the 103rd Brigade, to proceed to Lamitan from Isabela.

"He (Acierto) was given specific instructions (by Villanueva) to concentrate all forces in Tuburan, Basilan," the report added.

However, Sen. Noli de Castro, member of the Senate committee on national defense and security, said he was not inclined to believe the IG report and described it as "full of loopholes if not sanitized."

De Castro pointed out, in a statement, "the testimonies of about half a dozen Lamitan residents reasonably provided the missing links and explained the lapses in the report of the AFP-IG which was presented to the senators during an executive session on Aug. 30.

"After hearing the testimonies of Father (Cirilo) Nacorda’s witnesses, it is simply illogical to accept the military’s version as gospel truth," he said.