Regulating car use

Traffic demand management maybe done in two ways – regulating car ownership and regulating car use.  We wrote last Sunday that controlling car ownership, while maybe seen as the ultimate and most effective way of controlling the demand, is something inherently objectionable to people, especially in this car-crazed age, especially in the Philippines.  While I would support such an idea, I believe the country is not ready for it, and I have serious doubts if our national legislature would even attempt to craft such laws.  In its simplest sense, regulating car ownership means introducing a quota on the total number of cars (vehicles) to be sold each year, and allocate this either by auction, lottery, or a mix of both.  Singapore is the most prominent example of the auction method through its Certificate of Entitlement (COE) scheme.

The other traffic demand management scheme is through car use regulations.  Simply, if we can’t control car sales, maybe we can control car use.  Most people would certainly resent being restricted in the use of their cars, but we have been, actually, to a certain extent.  The moment government say “No Entry” or that you can’t pass this way or that way, or on certain times, that’s car use restriction.  What is needed is to come up with a macro level policies and strategies to reduce car use in order to manage traffic congestion.

Car use regulations takes many forms, some of which we are already familiar with.  These can also take forms of “push or pull” or “carrot or stick” approaches.  The simplest way would not even require a “regulation” but rather a “promotion” such as when we introduce sufficient and efficient mass transit options.  If these are present, many car trips may disappear.  Of course, this require significant infrastructure investment and will take decades, and in our context, would not be a solution in the short term.  The other schemes with similar intent is the promotion of “car sharing” and “ride-sharing.”  Car-pooling has been promoted in many countries and cities, and when car-pool lanes are introduced, then it becomes a regulation.

Those are voluntary.  When government introduces mandatory ones, then we enter into the realm of restriction schemes and road pricing.  Odd-even or “color coding” schemes reduce car use through certain segregation strategies.  For example, prohibiting cars with plates ending in 2 numerals for certain days as practiced in Metro Manila reduces car use (or depending on the classification) by 20%.  If we use odd-even scheme, a 50% reduction of vehicle population is envisaged.  There can be many permutations in the implementation.

Or maybe, total restrictions are not used, but car use is “priced” in “certain areas” and/or at “certain times,” the rationale of the latter being that traffic congestion is not constant throughout the day.  This is basically the basis of Singapore’s Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) system.  Try to drive through Singapore’s business center at 4:00 pm and you are slapped a huge price (electronically, of course).  This goes for certain avenues, streets and tollways.  By managing the price differences between routes, a city can actually influence driver behavior on where to pass, thus effectively distributing traffic.  And this can be adjusted depending on situations.

The broader policies on car use are more related to land use and zoning rather than transport itself.  Regulations on parking availability and pricing actually influence traffic congestion to a very significant extent, more than we can imagine.  Many Tokyo residents don’t drive to work because parking is expensive.  Providing “more” or “free” parking actually induces car use.  Of course we have to contend with on-street and illegal parking, if we don’t provide parking spaces.  The point is, if we can strategically determine where to provide and where to restrict parking, we will be better off utilizing its effect on traffic.

Which brings us back to Transit-Oriented Development or TOD. (To be continued)